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REASONABLE COPYRIGHT 
Irina D. Manta* 
Abstract: Using the lens of the cognitive bias literature, this Article exam-
ines and critiques the “reasonable man” standard, focusing on the use of 
the standard in an extremely fuzzy area of the law: copyright. In copy-
right, the test for infringement is whether a “reasonable observer” would 
believe that two works—often involving media that do not lend them-
selves to precise measurement—are substantially similar. I begin by cast-
ing doubt on the usefulness of the reasonable man standard in such a set-
ting. Are judges and juries truly able to determine what an abstract 
reasonable actor would find substantially similar? What types of cognitive 
biases will likely cloud this determination? And are biases likely to have a 
stronger or weaker effect when infringement questions are subjected to 
group deliberation as opposed to the individual decision making of judg-
es? Next, I address the problems that I uncover in the copyright context 
by first reviewing some potential solutions, including both a proposal to 
reduce the role of juries in substantial similarity determinations and the 
possibility of trial bifurcation. Ultimately, I show that an openly subjective 
standard that focuses on the works’ intended audience and uses social 
science surveys as evidence of infringement should replace the prevalent 
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“objective” reasonable observer standard. Implementing such a solution 
would at least partially acknowledge that we are dealing not with perfectly 
reasonable, but rather boundedly rational, actors. 
The test for infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague. 
—Learned Hand1 
Introduction 
 He does not act irrationally. He does not kill, steal, or intentionally 
inflict emotional distress, unless he has exceptional grounds for doing 
so. He is never reckless or negligent. He may not quite leap tall build-
ings in a single bound, but he knows his place in human society and 
does not step outside the bounds of legal behavior. Scholars, attorneys, 
and law students spend substantial portions of their lives unmasking 
who he is and what he does. He is probably the single most ubiquitous 
character in American case law, but his exact nature has managed to 
elude us for hundreds of years. “So may I introduce to you / The act 
you’ve known for all these years,”2 he who goes by the reasonable man. 
 Across areas of the law, and especially in criminal and torts mat-
ters, the judicial system measures human behavior against the reason-
ableness yardstick to determine its legality.3 We expect judges to be rea-
sonable, and to determine (for summary judgment purposes or on 
appeal) what a reasonable jury would do. In other areas, such as copy-
right, it is the opinion of the reasonable man that interests us—an in-
fringement case can rise or fall depending on whether he finds sub-
stantial similarity between two works.4 
 This reasonableness model relies on the idea that most people in 
society act roughly in accordance with rationality most of the time, or at 
least enough so that they do not significantly hurt others. The law holds 
individuals liable when they depart from a certain range of behaviors 
one would expect based on either a system of social norms or a utilitar-
ian cost-benefit analysis.5 Two types of problems may chip away at this 
framework. First, people of different social and cultural backgrounds 
                                                                                                                      
1 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). 
2 The Beatles, Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band, on Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts 
Club Band (Capitol Records 2002) (1967). 
3 See generally Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and 
Tort Law, 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1431 (2000) (providing a philosophical analysis of the role 
of reasonableness in tort law). 
4 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
5 See infra notes 38–63 and accompanying text. 
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may not all agree on the limits of appropriate behavior in a number of 
situations, and several scholars contend that the majoritarian, domi-
nant group may simply get its way due to hierarchical reasons.6 Second, 
cognitive biases complicate all the layers of this model. For a variety of 
reasons, as social science and behavioral law and economics have 
taught us, even well-meaning individuals may not always act as ironclad 
logic would dictate and may display pervasive patterns of skewed rea-
soning.7 Judges and juries are not immune from such biases,8 which 
may compound the existing elusiveness of the reasonable man’s nature. 
 Although issues of bounded rationality raise concerns in every ar-
ea of the law, copyright law adds further complications when it asks ju-
rors to evaluate whether copying of vague subject matters (such as art, 
music, or literature) took place, and if so, whether the new work is so 
“substantially similar” as to be unlawful.9 This is problematic because it 
requires imperfect jurors to judge imperfectly rational individuals by 
making decisions that are permeated with the risk of cultural and cog-
nitive biases at every level. To top it off, as in other types of cases, im-
perfect judges must determine whether a potential juror is “too biased” 
to sit on a jury (during voir dire), whether a “reasonable” jury could 
find the defendant liable (on a motion for summary judgment),10 and 
whether a jury’s verdict went against the great weight of the evidence 
(on a motion for new trial) or was entirely unreasonable (on appellate 
review).11 Even in the large percentage of cases that are submitted only 
                                                                                                                      
6 See infra notes 54–61 and accompanying text. 
7 A number of scholars offer foundational work in this area. See generally Christine Jolls 
et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998) (making 
broad recommendations for the economic and behavioral analysis of law); Russell B. 
Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption 
from Law and Economics, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 1051 (2000) (discussing the ways in which deci-
sion-making trends can inform an understanding of legal behavior and advocating for law-
and-behavioral science research). 
8 See infra notes 64–118 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 145–252 and accompanying text; see also Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 7, 
at 1069 (defining “bounded rationality” as when actors “make suboptimal choices among 
competing options given a set of preferences and use a range of heuristics—rules of thumb—
rather than complex cost-benefit analysis”). 
10 One scholar has argued that “[o]n summary judgment, the judge is effectively sit-
ting as a juror and deciding whether he or she could find for the plaintiff.” Elizabeth M. 
Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 Rutgers 
L. Rev. 705, 719 (2007). 
11 See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judging Jury Verdicts, 83 Tul. L. Rev. 157, 164–65 
(2008). 
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to a judge rather than to a jury,12 the law’s expectations of judges may 
be impossibly high. Judges are asked to dispassionately delineate legal 
rights despite being faced with the exact kinds of ambiguous materials 
that elicit the greatest risk of distortions caused by cognitive bias. The 
evidence for the proposition that judges are necessarily less biased than 
juries is slim, but so is the evidence that jury dynamics can cure the 
problems of bias.13 
 In this context, copyright is particularly intriguing in two respects. 
The first, as mentioned, relates to the materials that copyright covers, 
which are greatly subject to individual interpretation. Based on the re-
search about decision making in the face of ambiguous questions, this 
suggests that legal decisions in copyright cases will be subject to an in-
creased degree of heuristic (biased), as opposed to systematic, reason-
ing.14 The second stems from the dangers inherent in the seductively 
direct relationship between the judge or jurors and the alleged legal 
offense. Most litigation deals with past offenses that impose a degree of 
distance between legal decisionmakers and the events in question. In 
most cases, judges and jurors have to listen to testimony about past 
events from third parties and weigh conflicting accounts of what took 
place. Copyright infringement cases are among a small percentage of 
legal contests where the key question is one supposedly ascertainable 
purely in the present.15 Once access to a work has been established, a 
judge or jury examines songs, written materials, or pictorial representa-
tions of two works to determine substantial similarity.16 Decisionmakers 
in a variety of contexts traditionally suffer from cognitive overconfi-
dence; as this Article discusses, direct experiences with the disputed 
materials are likely to exacerbate this trend.17 Combining these points, 
the result is that copyright cases may produce outcomes that are espe-
                                                                                                                      
12 See infra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the ratio of judge versus jury 
trials in copyright cases). 
13 See infra notes 64–118 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 193–203 and accompanying text. 
15 Another scholar has remarked on a parallel note that this fixation in time is one of 
the features that distinguishes substantial similarity from the more dynamic fair use analy-
sis. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 Duke L.J. 
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 53), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2014395. 
16 See infra notes 151–192 and accompanying text. Patent law suffers from some analo-
gous difficulties when courts have to determine violations under the doctrine of equiva-
lents, which declares a device to be infringing “if it performs substantially the same func-
tion in substantially the same way to obtain the same result.” Graver Tank & Mfg. v. Linde 
Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 
U.S. 30, 42 (1929)). 
17 See infra notes 204–251 and accompanying text. 
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cially biased because overconfidence will be particularly likely to mini-
mize the degree of self-questioning by legal decisionmakers. If this is 
true, it could create the perfect storm of mediocre decisions with poor 
immediate corrective mechanisms. 
 One can already observe hints of such heightened confidence in 
non-copyright cases, such as the 2007 U.S. Supreme Court case Scott v. 
Harris, in which video evidence showed a car chase that concluded with 
a police officer hitting the fleeing suspect’s car with his own (and there-
by rendering the suspect a quadriplegic).18 During oral argument, Jus-
tice Stephen Breyer explained the strength of his conviction that the 
police officer was not liable, stating, “I see with my eyes that is what hap-
pened.”19 Similarly, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in the majority opinion, 
“We are happy to allow the videotape to speak for itself.”20 Subsequent 
empirical work, however, showed that the tape did not quite speak for 
itself in that its interpretation depended significantly on the viewer’s 
own background.21 This is a problem also likely to arise in the copyright 
context. 
 Understanding the cognitive underpinnings of courts’ analyses of 
copyright infringement offers a clue as to why the related doctrines and 
tests are widely considered unpredictable,22 vague, and confusing, and 
why they can result in uneven outcomes.23 Several problems result from 
this state of affairs, one of the most significant of which is the chilling 
                                                                                                                      
18 550 U.S. 372, 375, 378 (2007). 
19 Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Scott, 550 U.S. 372 (No. 05-1631). 
20 Scott, 550 U.S. at 378 n.5. 
21 See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to 
Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 837, 841 
(2009). 
22 See generally Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 Tex. L. Rev. 571 
(discussing outcome inequality in civil litigation). 
23 See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Copyrights and Creative Copying, 1 U. Ottawa L. & Tech. J. 75, 93–
102 (2003) (providing examples of problematic applications of the substantial similarity doc-
trine); Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of Substantial Simi-
larity, 20 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 719, 732 (1987) (criticizing the substantial similarity doctrine, 
which asks courts “to determine infringement on an unpredictable, impressionistic basis”); 
Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 719, 746–49 (2009) (cri-
tiquing the current standard and pointing out the fact- and context-driven nature of copy-
right claims); Laura G. Lape, The Metaphysics of the Law: Bringing Substantial Similarity Down to 
Earth, 98 Dick. L. Rev. 181, 185 (1994) (noting a “lack of any substance to the concept of 
substantial similarity as used to make the value judgment whether the defendant’s copying 
warrants liability”); Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J. 
Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 719, 719 (2010) (stating that the current tests for infringement 
“make no sense”); Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 
Harv. L. Rev. 683, 687–88 (2012) (suggesting that the current test “makes impossible and 
self-contradictory demands on factfinders”). 
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effect on the creative process if even generally careful artists risk be-
coming liable for large sums of money.24 Unfortunately, there is a 
dearth of empirical research in the area of the substantial similarity test, 
which makes conclusive determinations about judges’ and juries’ deci-
sion making more speculative. Recent work by Jamie Lund in the area 
of composition copyrights represents an exception, and serves as a fur-
ther wake-up call that we must probe into the way that courts handle 
infringement litigation.25 Lund shows that mock jurors, when asked to 
judge the similarity of two musical compositions, found them to be sub-
stantially similar over 86% of the time when they were performed simi-
larly, and not substantially similar over 84% of the time when they were 
performed differently, even though performance is supposed to be ir-
relevant in this context.26 This type of variability is disconcerting and 
raises questions as to how juries (and judges) process information in 
the copyright litigation context and whether the current standards in-
crease the odds that plaintiffs can present the evidence such as to make 
excessive claims for copyright protection. William Landes has suggested 
that plaintiffs win a significant majority of copyright cases that make it 
to trial, and that between 1978 and 2000, plaintiffs were successful 
about 73% of the time.27 This figure included a win rate of 70% in jury 
trials, which made up 27.7% of all copyright trials during the study pe-
riod, and a win rate of 74% in judge trials.28 Though a multitude of fac-
                                                                                                                      
24 See, e.g., Bartow, supra note 23, at 89 (“This fear is created in part by the creativity 
quantum paradox: it takes very little creativity to engender an entitlement to copyright 
protection, but, at least rhetorically, seems to take much more creativity, effort and ingenu-
ity to avoid infringing another work.”). This tension is exacerbated by a number of factors, 
including what one scholar has termed “copyfraud”: claims of copyright protection for 
materials where no such rights truly exist. See Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud and Other 
Abuses of Intellectual Property Law 2 (2011). 
25 See Jamie Lund, An Empirical Examination of the Lay Listener Test in Music Composition 
Copyright Infringement, 11 Va. Sports & Ent. L.J. 137, 171 (2011). 
26 Id. See generally Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray, Simulation, Realism, and the Study of 
the Jury, in Psychology and Law: An Empirical Perspective 322 (Neil Brewer & Kipling 
D. Williams eds., 2005) (discussing the use of mock juries to draw conclusions about actual 
juries). 
27 William M. Landes, An Empirical Analysis of Intellectual Property Litigation: Some Prelimi-
nary Results, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 749, 774 tbl.5 (2004). These figures were calculated using data 
from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and some scholars have ex-
pressed concerns about the overall accuracy of that data set. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Em-
pirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1581, 1652–53 
(2006). 
28 Landes, supra note 27, at 772, 774 tbl.5. Landes indicates that cost considerations are 
likely to drive parties toward judge trials rather than jury trials. Id. at 772. 
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tors contribute to these types of figures, this Article explores the role 
that cognitively skewed legal decision making may play. 
 In addition to the number of copyright issues raised by the explo-
sion of user-generated creative content, two recent developments in-
crease the urgency of clarifying and possibly changing the standard for 
copyright infringement. First, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2012 decision 
in Golan v. Holder retroactively lifted potentially millions of foreign-
created works out of the public domain, thus significantly increasing 
the universe of works whose owners could become plaintiffs in a wide 
variety of copyright infringement lawsuits.29 Second, Congress, schol-
ars, and the media have recently engaged in a spirited debate about the 
Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), the PROTECT IP Act (PIPA), and re-
lated legislation designed to combat online copyright infringement and 
other offenses.30 Although the public backlash against these bills may 
have succeeded in preventing their passage, their proponents continue 
with advocacy efforts, and more moderate legislation with similar basic 
goals is already on the table.31 Increased copyright enforcement, 
whether through the possible rise in the number of plaintiffs or the 
growth of legal tools available to pursue infringers, deepens the need to 
examine critically the current doctrine of substantial similarity. 
 Part I of this Article begins by exploring the role that the reason-
able man standard has traditionally played in the law and the main criti-
                                                                                                                      
29 See 132 S. Ct. 873, 905 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
30 See Stop Online Privacy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); Preventing Real Online 
Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act, S. 968, 112th Cong. 
(2011). A number of scholars have analyzed and commented on these proposed pieces of 
legislation. See, e.g., Bruce E. Boyden, What’s up with SOPA?, Marquette U. L. Sch. Fac. 
Blog (Nov. 17, 2011), http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2011/11/17/whats-up-with-
sopa/; Eric Goldman, SOPA/PROTECT-IP/OPEN Linkwrap #2, Tech. & Marketing L. Blog 
( Jan. 5, 2012), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/01/sopaprotectipop.htm; Mark 
Lemley et al., Don’t Break the Internet, 64 Stan. L. Rev. Online 34 (2011); David G. Post, 
SOPA and the Future of Internet Governance, Verdict (Feb. 13, 2012), http://verdict.justia. 
com/2012/02/13/sopa-and-the-future-of-internet-governance; Laurence H. Tribe, The 
“Stop Online Piracy Act” (SOPA) Violates the First Amendment (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www. 
scribd.com/doc/75153093/Tribe-Legis-Memo-on-SOPA-12-6-11-1. One of the more con-
troversial aspects of SOPA is its prescription of criminal penalties; I have comprehensively 
explored the debate over the role of such sanctions in intellectual property in my previous 
work. See generally Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property In-
fringement, 24 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 469 (2011) (discussing criminal sanctions for intellectual 
property infringement and exploring various theories for the disparity between the crimi-
nal treatments for different types of infringement). 
31 The most prominent of these is the Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital 
Trade Act (the OPEN Act). Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act, H.R. 
3782, 112th Cong. (2012); see, e.g., Goldman, supra note 30 (discussing the OPEN Act). 
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cisms that have been levied against the standard.32 It then discusses the 
extent to which judges and jurors themselves tend to act reasonably in 
their decision-making processes.33 Part II analyzes the role of reason-
ableness and bias in the copyright context and discloses flaws in the 
current standard for infringement and its application.34 Part III ad-
dresses these defects through a model that embraces the subjective na-
ture of copyright infringement determinations. Specifically, I propose 
that courts should shift their focus toward the reaction of the intended 
audience of works and begin allowing related evidence drawn from so-
cial science into copyright trials.35 
I. The Reasonable Man Through the Lens of the Law 
 The reasonable man has played a key role in the law but has also 
been the subject of many criticisms. Section A explores the use of the 
reasonable man as a legal standard.36 Section B then identifies how bias 
can play a role in determining what is reasonable for both juries and 
judges.37 
A. The Reasonable Man as a Legal Standard 
 What constitutes reasonable conduct in the law defies precise and 
uniform formulations and often comes down to an approximation of 
whether the benefits of a specific set of actions exceed the costs.38 This 
issue arose in 1947 in the classic torts case United States v. Carroll Towing 
Co., in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit faced the 
question of when a barge owner should be liable for damage to other 
vessels if his barge breaks away from its moorings.39 Judge Learned 
Hand, eschewing any bright-line rule, stated that the duty of the barge 
owner to prevent such damage depends on the probability that the 
barge will break away, the seriousness of the likely damage, and the 
burden of providing preventative measures.40 It is thus a utilitarian cal-
                                                                                                                      
 
32 See infra notes 38–63 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 64–144 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra notes 145–252 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 253–288 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 38–63 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 64–144 and accompanying text. 
38 See infra notes 39–63 and accompanying text. 
39 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
40 Id. The idea of imposing liability on the cheapest cost avoider in a number of tort 
settings and other contexts arises from a similar calculation. See generally Guido Calabresi, 
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culus, with some difficulties arising when not all the values that must 
enter the calculus are of a monetary nature and when a degree of sub-
jective valuation inevitably clouds the analysis.41 Despite its difficulties, 
this calculus has become one of the most famous in legal history and 
was nicknamed the “Learned Hand Test,” despite some evidence sug-
gesting that Judge Hand may not have been its first proponent.42 
 Be that as it may, the concept of the reasonable man itself un-
doubtedly possesses a long trail in Anglo-Saxon legal history. For in-
stance, in his 1881 magnum opus, The Common Law, Oliver Wendell 
Holmes expounded the virtues of using “the average man, the man of 
ordinary intelligence and reasonable prudence”43 as the proper legal 
yardstick to determine many forms of liability. Holmes explained that 
the reasons the law seeks to be generally applicable, without consider-
ing individual variations in personality or background, are twofold.44 
First, measuring a person’s abilities is much more difficult than judging 
his “knowledge of law,” since it is presumed “that every man knows the 
law.”45 Second, and more importantly, Holmes gave a utilitarian expla-
nation for why a general, objective standard should prevail over a sub-
jective one: 
If, for instance, a man is born hasty and awkward, is always hav-
ing accidents and hurting himself or his neighbors, no doubt 
                                                                                                                      
The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (1970) (developing a theory 
of accident law using an economic lens). 
41 Guido Calabresi, Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law: Private Law Per-
spectives on a Public Law Problem 161–62 n.218 (1985). Of course, conceptions of 
utilitarianism and its precise goals have varied greatly over time. See, e.g., Martin J. Wie-
ner, Reconstructing the Criminal: Culture, Law, and Policy in England, 1830–
1914, at 53 (1990) (stating that “in early Victorian England . . . utilitarians themselves usu-
ally held an implicit moral agenda rather distinct from the more permissive modern-day 
utilitarian philosophies”). 
42 Calabresi, supra note 40, at 159 n.199 (comparing the test to one previously pro-
posed by Henry Terry and noting that Judge Hand had most likely read Terry’s work on 
the subject) (citing Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 42–43 (1915)). 
43 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 51 (1881). Despite its fame, the 
Learned Hand Test has not found universal acceptance in American case law, and some 
scholars believe that most judges in negligence cases interpret due care as “reasonable 
care, not rational care.” See Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence 
Theory, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 311, 361 (1996); see also Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand For-
mula, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1015, 1018 (1994) (summarizing the scholarly critiques). These schol-
ars view Judge Hand as a proponent of the latter and see the former as more strongly 
grounded in social contract theory. Keating, supra, at 360–61; see Gilles, supra, at 1018 (not-
ing that some scholars claim that the existing “reasonable person standard . . . marginal-
izes or even supplants the Hand Formula”). 
44 Holmes, supra note 43, at 108. 
45 Id. 
1312 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1303 
his congenital defects will be allowed for in the courts of 
Heaven, but his slips are no less troublesome to his neighbors 
than if they sprang from guilty neglect. His neighbors accord-
ingly require him, at his proper peril, to come up to their 
standard, and the courts which they establish decline to take 
his personal equation into account.46 
The only departures from this model that Holmes found justifiable 
were those in which manifest defects like blindness or infancy truly pre-
vented an individual from following usual legal norms, and in which 
other members of society would be able to see these defects and take 
additional precautions when dealing with such an impaired individ-
ual.47 The reality on the ground looked more complex, especially when 
it came to mentally ill individuals. One scholar who specializes in the 
period in which Holmes wrote has noted that “[t]he legal borderland 
between competence and incompetence was indeed a broad and po-
rous one in nineteenth-century America.”48 Rather than taking a rigid 
view, judges fashioned pragmatic treatments that balanced Enlighten-
ment notions of pure individual responsibility with the human behavior 
that they encountered in the courtroom.49 
 In summary, the image emerges that the concept of reasonable-
ness in the law uses utilitarian notions as both its foundation and its 
guide. As to the first point, according to Holmes, we require reasonable 
behavior from everyone because doing otherwise would harm society.50 
As to the second matter, reasonable behavior is behavior whose benefits 
exceed the costs.51 Of course, these propositions open an entire pantry 
of cans of worms. How do we calculate the benefits? What are the costs? 
And what do we do with actors that, due to their own fault or other fac-
                                                                                                                      
46 Id. Indeed, a completely subjective legal standard has never been adopted and is an 
inherently problematic idea given that legal fault is normally based precisely on deviations 
from community norms. Warren A. Seavey, Negligence—Subjective or Objective?, 41 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1, 4 (1927). 
47 Holmes, supra note 43, at 109–10. One scholar explains that the “paradigm of ob-
jective-ideal-tempered-by-subjective-deviation” does not always lower the burden for groups 
such as the disabled; rather, at times it places greater obligations on them (such as having 
to use special glasses and other devices to increase general safety). Anita Bernstein, The 
Communities That Make Standards of Care Possible, 77 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 735, 747–48 (2002). 
48 Susanna L. Blumenthal, The Default Legal Person, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1135, 1203 (2007). 
49 Id. at 1264. At the same time, criminal law was viewed as a tool to correct dangerous 
personal flaws. Michael Meranze, Punishment, Revolution, and Authority in Phila-
delphia: 1760–1835, at 260 (1996). For example, the use of solitary confinement “prom-
ised to create a space where the reconstruction of individuals’ subjectivity could occur.” Id. 
50 See Holmes, supra note 43, at 108. 
51 See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. 
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tors, were unaware of some of the benefits or costs, or were unable to 
complete this type of calculation altogether? This suggests the possibil-
ity that, in some situations, we are actually likely to turn to what the av-
erage person would do (à la Holmes), whether that turns out to satisfy 
a grander utilitarian scheme or not. One of the possible assumptions 
behind the decision to use the average person is the belief that if eve-
ryone acts roughly according to that standard, the utilitarian calculus 
will be served about as well as pragmatically possible. Alan Miller and 
Ronen Perry have teased apart positive versus normative theories of the 
reasonable man, and their work, rooted in social theory, suggests that 
“any statistical methodology used to study the reasonable person is nec-
essarily invalid. Any judge or juror who claims to understand the nature 
of the reasonable person from his or her familiarity with society is mis-
taken.”52 Hence, trying to use the average man as a welfare-maximizing 
tool may be doomed on a fundamental level. 
 Even leaving aside Miller and Perry’s concerns and adopting a 
softer standard that tolerates some degree of measurement imperfec-
tions, if judges and juries take into account individual factors of defen-
dants in some circumstances but not others, how can we know if the 
utilitarian scheme is in fact being served?53 After all, looking at individ-
ual factors means that conflicting values may or may not even each oth-
er out (e.g., punishing criminals for their deeds despite respecting that 
their backgrounds may have contributed to their behavior), because 
jurors may have tended to be skewed in one direction or another. The 
Holmes model therefore largely comes across as aspirational rather 
than actual. Indeed, at least one scholar has gone as far as asking why 
“the [Learned Hand] test is still seen as the prototypical expression of 
the law’s fairness and objectivity rather than, for example, as a mecha-
nism for facilitating the coercive exercise of social power.”54 
                                                                                                                      
 
52 Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 323, 328 
(2012). The authors posit a set of five axioms necessary to any coherent theory of the rea-
sonable man, and they show how any attempt to measure his nature is bound to violate 
some segment of this set. Id. 
53 These types of questions, among others, arise in the context of the debate between 
rule and act utilitarianism. See, e.g., David O. Brink, Mill’s Ambivalence About Rights, 90 B.U. 
L. Rev. 1669, 1671–72 (2010) (discussing the distinctions between the two). 
54 Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness 
in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 Yale L.J. 1177, 1178 (1990). This scholar argues that reason-
ableness serves as a mediator for the tension between the freedom of the individual and 
the safety of society, and it thus serves as “a vehicle for importing a cost/benefit analysis 
into the law, a method for distinguishing risk-creating conduct that social groups are free 
to engage in from conduct that, because it threatens collective security, requires [legal] 
regulation.” Id. at 1183. Some scholars believe that even contract law, a realm supposedly 
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 Historically, some of the most significant attacks against the use of 
the reasonable man standard have arisen from concerns about gender 
and racial bias in the courtroom or even in the initial formulation of 
legal rules.55 A number of scholars have argued that the word “man” in 
the reasonable man standard did not simply include both sexes but was 
rather developed at a time when “virtually all judges, jurors, lawyers, 
legislators, and law professors were men, and women had virtually no 
independent public, economic, or legal identity.”56 Later, when courts 
tried to reformulate the standard to become more gender neutral, such 
as by referring to the “reasonable person,” they still often incorporated 
preexisting notions of the content of reasonableness that were largely 
based on the average middle-class man.57 One scholar argues that the 
notion of reason has historically been used to disparage women, mi-
norities, and individuals of limited education.58 At least one other 
scholar agrees, pointing out that often more powerful parties advocate 
for an objective approach because “these standards always, and already, 
reflect them and their culture.”59 
                                                                                                                      
 
driven by individual agreements free from societal pressures, is “a reflection of collective 
determination, and thus inherently regulatory and coercive.” Morton J. Horwitz, The 
Transformation of American Law, 1870–1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 50 
(1992) (discussing Arthur Corbin’s work and his influences). 
55 See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 41, at 23. Judge Guido Calabresi explains how, in 
England, the reasonable man was “the man on the Clapham Omnibus—a definition which 
. . . always left [Calabresi] utterly cold since [he has] never met the Clapham Omnibus or 
any man on it, and [he has] no idea why reasonableness should attach especially to those 
who ride that line.” Id. See generally Barbara Young Welke, Recasting American Lib-
erty: Gender, Race, Law and the Railroad Revolution, 1865–1920 (2001) (describing 
the transformation of the law in response to a cultural shift away from purely “male” val-
ues). 
56 Caroline A. Forell & Donna M. Matthews, A Law of Her Own: The Reason-
able Woman as a Measure of Man 6 (2000). See Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, The 
Legal, Ethical, and Social Implications of the “Reasonable Woman” Standard in Sexual Harassment 
Cases, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 773, 807 (1993) (“The term ‘reasonable man’ is burdened by 
an enormous amount of historical baggage. Dating back at least two hundred years, the 
term undeniably evolved from extremely male-oriented legal and cultural roots.”). 
57 Id. at 6–7. Judge Calabresi has questioned the “reasonable person” standard, ex-
plaining that if “women are now expected to act as reasonable men did before . . . rather 
than men being expected to act, at least in part, as reasonable women did, then equality 
may be there—but at the cost of cultural subjugation!” Calabresi, supra note 40, at 29. 
58 Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 445, 456 
(1997). Bernstein calls the reasonable person standard “hollow” and argues that the idea 
of a genderless victim of sexual harassment minimizes gender differences in the percep-
tion of sexual behavior in employment settings. Id. at 465. She proposes the introduction 
of a “respectful person” standard to address the flaws of the reasonable person standard in 
sexual harassment law. Id. at 483–506. 
59 Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 813, 818 
(1992). This objective versus subjective distinction parallels, in part, the tension between 
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 A number of approaches have tried to maintain a reasonableness 
standard while lending more credence to victims of offenses such as 
sexual crimes and torts. One proposal suggests flipping the analysis in 
such cases away from a focus on the perpetrator’s perspective (in other 
words, how men would view the behavior of the usually male offenders 
and their usually female victims) and toward a focus on “whether a rea-
sonable woman would have acted as the perpetrator acted, as well as 
whether a reasonable woman would have responded with behavior simi-
lar to the target’s.”60 One scholar has attacked such “reasonable woman” 
standards as being sexist and stereotyping against both men and wom-
en, impossible to apply, and therefore unlikely to make a difference in 
real cases.61 Whereas areas such as gender and race prove particularly 
contentious in discussions about the reasonable man, the number of 
characteristics that can influence one’s conception of what is reasonable 
or that can be used to tweak the standard is nearly infinite. 
 The remainder of this Article makes reference to three types of 
reasonableness analyses. The first type, which is critiqued in this Sec-
tion, deals with the question of whether a defendant’s actions conform 
to those of the reasonable man. The second type is employed when 
judges have to decide on appeal whether a jury or a judge below them 
was reasonable (which includes the question of whether any reasonable 
jury could reach a certain conclusion, such as in Scott). To shed light on 
such decision making on the part of judges and juries, the next Section 
                                                                                                                      
the view that criminal behavior is caused by the individual due to faults of his own and the 
view that crime is a product of social forces over which the individual has little control. See 
generally Michael Willrich, City of Courts: Socializing Justice in Progressive Era 
Chicago (2003) (describing this tension and explaining how the rhetoric of social respon-
sibility for crime brought about the creation of new services through the welfare state but 
also an erosion of civil liberties, such as through eugenics and coerced medical treatment). 
Of course, the question of causality in this context is complex and difficult to resolve. See 
Thomas L. Haskell, Persons as Uncaused Causes: John Stuart Mill, the Spirit of Capitalism, and 
the “Invention” of Formalism, in The Culture of the Market: Historical Essays 441, 
441–45 (Thomas L. Haskell & Richard F. Teichgraeber III eds., 1993). 
60 Forell & Matthews, supra note 56, at 17. 
61 Paul B. Johnson, The Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment Law: Progress or Illusion?, 
28 Wake Forest L. Rev. 619, 621–22 (1993). Specifically, Johnson argues that the reason-
able woman standard is impossible to apply in sexual harassment contexts when it asks 
that male triers of fact understand and apply the perspective of a reasonable 
woman, even though men are, by definition, presumed unable to do so be-
cause of the allegedly characteristic male view that sexual harassment is harm-
less amusement and the supposed male bias that systematically ignores the 
experiences of women. 
Id. at 642. 
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discusses some of the research on cognitive bias and how it delineates 
the contours of these actors’ ability to make optimal determinations.62 
The third type of reasonableness analysis enters the picture when a 
judge or jury has to deduce what a reasonable man would think, and 
Part II illuminates the boundaries of this process.63 These three types of 
analyses, as will become apparent, exhibit more commonalities than 
differences in the kinds and levels of biases that infiltrate them, and 
hence—after having classified them here—this Article at times alter-
nates in their discussion without referring back to this taxonomy. 
B. The Reasonable Jury and Judge 
1. Juries and Bias 
 The question of whether American law should provide for the 
guaranteed right to be tried by a jury became an important point of 
contention during the debates surrounding the adoption of the United 
States Constitution, with the Anti-Federalists refusing to approve any 
draft that did not include such a right.64 They believed that “the jury 
was the best available means of thwarting unpopular laws enacted by an 
insensitive national legislature[,] provided a method of protecting 
debtors from inflexible rules in the regulation of commerce[, and] 
could rein in corrupt or overactive judges.”65 When it comes to the is-
sue of bias, many in the legal community operate under the idea that 
jury deliberations will minimize individual biases and lead to fairer out-
comes.66 Indeed, this belief seems to be at the very foundation of our 
jury system. 
 The concern about the influence of individual biases, whether 
based in jurors’ backgrounds or particular idiosyncrasies, is not far-
fetched. An empirical study by Dan Kahan, David Hoffman, and Don-
ald Braman about individuals’ perceptions of the infamous car chase 
video from the 2007 case, Scott v. Harris, proves illustrative.67 In Scott, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that a police officer had not violated the 
                                                                                                                      
62 See infra notes 64–144 and accompanying text. 
63 See infra notes 145–252 and accompanying text. 
64 Stephan Landsman, The History and Objectives of the Civil Jury System, in Verdict: As-
sessing the Civil Jury System 22 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). 
65 Id. at 38. 
66 David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, & Daniel Kahneman, Deliberating About Dollars: The 
Severity Shift, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1139, 1157 (2000). 
67 See generally Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 21 (describing the methodology 
of the study and its results”). 
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Fourth Amendment when he intentionally hit the car of a driver who 
refused to comply with police orders to pull over and instead led the 
officers on a car chase; this collision left the driver a quadriplegic.68 
The Court concluded that “no reasonable jury” would disagree with the 
contention that the car chase presented “a substantial and immediate 
risk of serious physical injury to others,” which meant that the officer’s 
efforts to interrupt the chase were reasonable and that he should win 
on summary judgment.69 In the study, Kahan and his coauthors showed 
a diverse group of 1350 individuals the video of the car chase (which 
the Supreme Court had placed on its website) and examined the indi-
viduals’ views of the facts.70 The study found that although the majority 
of subjects did indeed agree with the Court, members of some specific 
subgroups did not; “African Americans, low-income workers, and resi-
dents of the Northeast, for example, tended to form more pro-plaintiff 
views of the facts than did the Court. So did individuals who character-
ized themselves as liberals and Democrats.”71 This echoes earlier re-
search, such as a study that found that preexisting attitudes toward the 
criminal justice system and the police influenced the size of damage 
awards that mock jurors were willing to give in a hypothetical case.72 
 The search for an explanation of the dissonance between the 
Court’s “no reasonable jury” pronouncement and the outcome of Ka-
han’s study yields problematic results. First, it is surely not plausible that 
the racial or political groups that Kahan identified contain a lower per-
centage of reasonable people than other groups do. Another explana-
tion is that although some study subjects would have reached a differ-
ent conclusion based on their isolated judgment, no representative jury 
would have disagreed with the Court. This could be true only if the 
views of persons from certain groups are routinely steamrolled in the 
jury deliberation process73 (or if these individuals could never consti-
                                                                                                                      
 
68 Scott, 550 U.S. at 381. 
69 Id. 
70 Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 21, at 854–55. 
71 Id. at 841. 
72 Jonathan D. Casper et al., Juror Decision Making, Attitudes, and the Hindsight Bias, 13 
Law & Hum. Behav. 291, 307 (1989). 
73 Studying these matters empirically remains a complex task. A recent study suggests 
that individuals of lower socioeconomic or educational status or from some specific back-
grounds (e.g., Asian American women) report a lower level of participation in jury delib-
erations. Erin York Cornwall & Valerie P. Hans, Representation Through Participation: A Multi-
level Analysis of Jury Deliberations, 45 Law & Soc’y Rev. 667, 681–86 (2011). African 
American individuals, however, reported higher levels of participation than Caucasian or 
Hispanic jurors. Id. at 681–82. Some limitations of this research include that the data was 
based on self-reports and that “[a]ll participation is not equally relevant, meaningful, or 
1318 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1303 
tute the majority in any given jury).74 Indeed, there is actually some 
evidence that—unlike in the movie Twelve Angry Men in which one man 
convinces his eleven fellow jurors that their initial conclusion in favor 
of conviction was wrong— “the verdict favored by a majority of the jury 
at the onset of deliberation usually prevails.”75 Other explanations exist 
as well, but they begin to erode our understanding of the legal test as it 
is currently stated. For instance, when the Court spoke of “no reason-
able jury,” it may have actually meant “very few reasonable juries.” Tak-
ing this a step further, the possibility arises that (1) there is no such 
thing as a reasonable jury, or (2) even if there is, courts are hard-
pressed to discern what such a jury would do.76 
 One related problem with objective standards is that they may 
make it more likely that jurors, who view themselves as reasonable, will 
ask themselves if they would have acted the same way as the defen-
                                                                                                                      
persuasive for the task of deliberating toward a verdict, so an important question for fur-
ther research is how participation relates to other outcomes, such as influence, verdicts, 
and juror satisfaction.” Id. at 693. 
74 In fact, minorities tend to be statistically underrepresented in jury pools. See, e.g., 
Hiroshi Fukurai et al., Race and the Jury: Racial Disenfranchisement and the 
Search for Justice 65 (1993) (showing that minorities and individuals of low educational 
status are underrepresented on juries); David Kairys et al., Jury Representativeness: A Man-
date for Multiple Source Lists, 65 Calif. L. Rev. 776, 803–04 (1977) (finding significant dis-
parities between the statistically expected and the actual representation of minorities on 
juries); Nancy J. King & G. Thomas Munsterman, Stratified Juror Selection: Cross-Section by 
Design 79 Judicature 273, 273–74 (1996) (discussing the gravity of the problem). A num-
ber of scholars have expressed concern that the impact of unrepresentative jury composi-
tion on litigation outcomes might be to the disfavor of minorities. See, e.g., Andrew D. Lei-
pold, Objective Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Problems of Discriminatory Intent in the Criminal 
Law, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 559, 579 (1998) (“[H]istory is littered with ugly incidents of 
juries using their powers to disadvantage minorities.”) (citation omitted). In one study of 
mock jurors, juror-defendant similarity led to in-group favorability when pro-conviction 
evidence was weak or moderately strong, which increased the likelihood of a “not guilty” 
verdict for in-group, as compared to out-group defendants. Norbert L. Kerr et al., Defen-
dant-Juror Similarity and Mock Juror Judgments, 19 Law & Hum. Behav. 545, 561 (1995). In a 
follow-up study, however, evidence that overwhelmingly pointed to guilt influenced both 
African American and Caucasian jurors to judge in-group, same-race defendants as more 
guilty than out-group, other-race ones if the jurors anticipated being placed in a group 
decision-making situation in which their own race would constitute a minority. Id. 
75 Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us About Decision-
making by Civil Juries, in Verdict: Assessing the Civil Jury System, supra note 64, at 137, 
159; see Twelve Angry Men (MetroGoldwynMayer Studios 1957). See generally Reid Hastie 
et al., Inside the Jury (1983) (studying jury decision making); Garold Stasser et al., The 
Social Psychology of Jury Deliberations: Structure, Process, and Product, in The Psychology of 
the Courtroom 221 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray eds., 1982) (discussing the proc-
ess of jury deliberations from foreman selection to the final decision). 
76 See Miller & Perry, supra note 52, at 387 (discussing why any positive, rather than 
normative, reasonable standard may be inherently bound to fail). 
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dant.77 Jurors may thus implicitly view a defendant as similar to them-
selves with respect to gender, race, sexual orientation, and other attrib-
utes.78 The solution is not as simple as moving to a subjective standard 
of reasonableness, in the sense of assigning the defendant’s attributes 
to the reasonable person (including personality features), because then 
all outside constraints disappear and “the reasonableness standard sim-
ply collapses.”79 In the end, various forms of distortions have been 
found to enter juror decision making, regardless of whether defendants 
are similar to or different from jurors. The remainder of this Section 
discusses some of the relevant research on this topic and also shows that 
judges remain far from immune to some of the same problems.80 
 In the 1970s, Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel argued that the Ameri-
can jury system “represents a deep commitment to the use of laymen in 
the administration of justice.”81 Their seminal work for the University of 
Chicago Jury Project sought to provide the empirical backing to support 
the continued survival of the institution of the American jury.82 George 
Priest credits these scholars’ efforts for the long-term trust that the 
United States has placed in juries because their project’s findings sug-
gested “that the civil jury was a superior institution for adjudicating dis-
putes involving complex societal values, that the jury served as an im-
portant instrument of popular control over law enforcement, and that 
the jury brought a superior sense of social equity to the decisionmaking 
process.”83 Priest criticizes the wholesale endorsement of the Kalven-
Zeisel view, however, and produces evidence to show that few jury trials 
truly involve important societal values.84 He concludes that the delays 
and costs of such trials weigh against the indiscriminate use of juries in 
civil litigation.85 
 Though the hope for juries is that their group deliberation proc-
esses will bring extreme positions into the fold of an acceptable average 
range, the phenomenon of group polarization can play a magnifying 
rather than smoothing role. A number of studies involving mock juries 
                                                                                                                      
77 Cynthia Lee, Murder and the Reasonable Man: Passion and Fear in the Crim-
inal Courtroom 206 (2003). 
78 See id. 
79 Id. at 207. 
80 See infra notes 81–144 and accompanying text. 
81 Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 3 (1971). 
82 See id. at 10. 
83 George L. Priest, The Role of the Civil Jury in a System of Private Litigation, 1990 U. Chi. 
Legal F. 161, 162 (citation omitted). 
84 Id. at 172–81. 
85 Id. at 165. 
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have found that juries tend to award amounts that exceed the average 
of the amounts that individual jurors would have awarded prior to de-
liberations.86 One large study designed by David Schkade, Cass Sun-
stein, and Daniel Kahneman that involved 500 mock juries with a total 
of 3000 mock jurors confirmed this finding: group deliberations consis-
tently produce dollar verdicts that exceed the median of jurors’ pre-
deliberation determinations.87 The study’s authors identified a number 
of phenomena that may have contributed to this outcome, the key one 
being a rhetorical asymmetry that leads jurors who have decided to give 
a nonzero monetary award to perceive arguments in favor of increased 
awards as more persuasive.88 Another proposed explanation related to 
social comparison and the possibility that mock jurors did not want to 
appear overly cautious compared to other individuals in the group, 
which influenced their position.89 In any case, the authors’ overall con-
clusion is sobering: “Among many in the legal community there is the 
hope, and indeed the conviction, that deliberation by a group of jurors 
will overcome individual biases and produce more just and more pre-
dictable verdicts . . . . [O]ur findings lend no support to this view.”90 Of 
particular concern was that although the rhetorical asymmetry could 
theoretically be counteracting other biases in the system (such as one 
against personal injury plaintiffs or lawsuits), the asymmetry had a 
                                                                                                                      
86 MacCoun, supra note 75, at 160 (summarizing the findings of several mock jury 
studies in this context). But see James H. Davis et al., Effects of Group Size and Procedural Influ-
ence on Consensual Judgments of Quantity: The Example of Damage Awards and Mock Civil Juries, 
73 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 703, 713–14 (1997) (finding a reduction of mock civil 
jury awards from a single mock juror to a group of six, and from a group of six to a group 
of twelve in a setting involving a defendant with “deep pockets”). Davis and his coauthors 
noted that their study conflicted with their own earlier findings (in which six-member 
juries awarded higher amounts than single jurors), which they attributed to changing so-
cietal norms and a possible backlash against excessive tort awards in the years between 
their two studies. Id. at 714 (citing James H. Davis et al., Quantitative Decisions by Groups and 
Individuals: Voting Procedures and Monetary Awards by Mock Civil Juries, 29 J. Experimental 
Soc. Psychol. 326 (1993)). 
87 Schkade, Sunstein, & Kahneman, supra note 66, at 1140–41. 
88 Id. at 1161. The authors confirmed this result in a follow-up study, which found that 
a sample of law students found it more difficult to argue for a lower, rather than a higher, 
award when a (hypothetical) jury had already decided that liability existed and some 
amount of damages would have to be paid. Id. at 1161–62. 
89 Id. at 1166. 
90 Id. at 1157. A different study found some reduction of variability among mock juries 
as opposed to individual jurors, but there was still a great amount of unexplained variabil-
ity. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages: Sources of 
Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DePaul L. Rev. 301, 317 (1998). 
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“mechanical, case-independent quality.”91 Other studies of group de-
liberations also found a similar award-increasing effect.92 
                                                                                                                     
 Among the potential other mechanisms that introduce distortions 
into the legal system, individual hindsight bias has been one of the most 
seriously studied in the legal context.93 For example, in a study of 277 
mock jurors and 95 judges, Reid Hastie and Kip Viscusi presented sub-
jects with a scenario in which a railroad company had a choice whether 
to stop its operations until its tracks were improved or to continue run-
ning before repairs took place.94 The study included both foresight 
conditions (subjects had to decide whether the railroad should halt op-
erations or keep working) and hindsight conditions (subjects had to 
decide, upon learning that the railroad had continued to operate legally 
and an accident took place that damaged a number of parties, whether 
the railroad owed punitive damages in addition to pre-existing compen-
satory ones).95 Subjects were told that only reckless conduct would suf-
fice for an award of punitive damages, and that such conduct had to en-
tail “a conscious choice of action, either with knowledge of serious 
danger to others or with knowledge of facts which would disclose the 
danger to any reasonable person.”96 Mock jurors displayed significant 
hindsight bias on all related measures, whereas judges showed a lower 
and often statistically insignificant tendency toward such bias.97 Further, 
Hastie and Viscusi compared the economically optimal outcome with 
jurors’ and judges’ decisions, and their results suggested that judges 
 
91 Schkade, Sunstein, & Kahneman, supra note 66, at 1172. 
92 See, e.g., Diamond et al., supra note 90, at 316. In an earlier review of the literature 
on individual versus group judgments, Norbert Kerr and his coauthors concluded that 
there was no simple answer to the question of who exhibits more bias. Norbert L. Kerr et 
al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 Psychol. Rev. 687, 713 (1996). 
The scholars identified several factors that determined whether an individual or group 
would be more or less likely to fall victim to various biases, including the size of a group, 
the magnitude of individual bias, the location of the bias, the definition of the bias, the 
normative ideal, and the nature of the group process. Id. In a later study, Kerr and other 
scholars showed that mock juries were more biased than jurors in settings in which a de-
fendant had a moderate probability of conviction in the absence of biasing information, 
but that the trend was reversed in situations in which the probability of conviction was very 
high or very low. Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Jurors vs. Bias in Juries: New Evidence from the 
SDS Perspective, 80 Organizational Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 70, 79–81 
(1999). 
93 See infra notes 94–118 and accompanying text. 
94 Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can’t Do Well: The Jury’s Performance as a Risk 
Manager, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 901, 905 (1998). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 904–05. 
97 Id. at 906. 
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were able to act rationally “in situations believed to create the most irra-
tionality. In contrast, the citizen, mock-jurors do not appear to be sensi-
tive to benefit-cost relationships.”98 These findings suggest that in some 
settings, jurors struggle with the application of a standard that involves 
determinations of what the reasonable man would do. 
 As with all studies, however, the Hastie-Viscusi study had a number 
of limitations, including that it examined the decision making of indi-
vidual jurors rather than their operations within a group.99 Picking up 
on this and other issues, some alternative explanations for the Hastie-
Viscusi findings have been proposed, most vocally by Richard Lem-
pert.100 Lempert contends that (1) to the extent punitive damage 
awards failed to act as a helpful risk management device, the reason was 
not jury hindsight bias, and (2) there is no reason to believe that judges 
fall prey to hindsight bias less frequently than jurors.101 Lempert con-
structs a vigorous methodological attack against the Hastie-Viscusi 
study. Among numerous other criticisms, Lempert argues that Hastie 
and Viscusi did not consider the possibility of debiasing jurors, that 
their figures do not actually demonstrate that judges are less likely than 
jurors to be affected by hindsight bias, and that their baseline of what 
would constitute a rational cost-benefit outcome was arbitrary.102 Lem-
pert concludes that “neither their empirical study nor their review of 
the psychological literature . . . show that judges are cognitively supe-
rior to juries.”103 
                                                                                                                      
98 Id. at 908. 
99 See id. at 905. 
100 See Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damage Awards: Failures of a Social 
Science Case for Change, 48 DePaul L. Rev. 867, 874, 892 (1999). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 870, 882–84, 886. Lempert also questions the use of hindsight bias terminol-
ogy in this context given that he believes that “ex post risk estimates are likely to be more 
accurate than ex ante estimates.” Id. at 874. This inquiry parallels the argument that hind-
sight “represents fully rational Bayesian updating.” Mark Kelman, Behavioral Economics as 
Part of a Rhetorical Duet: A Response to Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1577, 1584 
(1998); see also Mark Kelman et al., Decomposing Hindsight Bias, 16 J. Risk & Uncertainty 
251, 258 (1998) (defending some forms of hindsight bias as helpful). Critics have replied, 
however, that “Kelman does not say anything to undermine the central empirical work on 
hindsight bias.” Christine Jolls et al., Theories and Tropes: A Reply to Posner and Kelman, 50 
Stan. L. Rev. 1593, 1606 (1998). 
103 Lempert, supra note 100, at 892. As a general matter, some recent brain imaging 
work has also suggested that a number of individuals experience an actual decrease in 
intelligence and cognitive functioning in group contexts. Kenneth T. Kishida et al., Implicit 
Signals in Small Group Settings and Their Impact on the Expression of Cognitive Capacity and Asso-
ciated Brain Responses, 367 Phil. Transactions Royal Soc’y B 704, 713–14 (2012). 
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 Although I similarly question the superiority of judges when it 
comes to matters of cognitive bias, the studies that show distinct risks 
from bias on the part of juries do not end with the Hastie-Viscusi find-
ings. For example, one study assessed mock jurors for their foresight 
versus hindsight assessments of whether a municipality should take or 
have taken measures to prevent against flood damage imposed on ri-
parian property owners.104 In the foresight condition, only 24% of sub-
jects recommended a particular safety measure, whereas in the hind-
sight condition, 56.9% of subjects stated that the measure should have 
been taken.105 Of the subjects in the hindsight condition, half were ex-
posed to materials tailored to debias them by specifically warning them 
against hindsight bias, but this measure made no difference in the sub-
jects’ determinations.106 
 A different study had mock jurors (consisting of adults from an 
actual jury pool and students) determine whether a plaintiff should 
receive compensatory and punitive damages for the behavior that po-
licemen had inflicted upon him during a search of his home that po-
tentially violated his civil rights.107 The researchers found fairly consis-
tent hindsight bias in mock jurors’ determinations; mock jurors tended 
to find for police liability and give increased compensatory and puni-
tive damages at a greater rate when they believed that the search incul-
pated rather than exculpated the plaintiff.108 In this study, subjects were 
asked to determine whether “a reasonable person, knowing what the 
officers knew prior to entering the apartment, [would believe that the 
plaintiff] was guilty of committing a crime.”109 The answer to this ques-
tion was not supposed to be based on subsequent events, but the data 
suggests the opposite.110 
 This finding is consistent with those of other studies, such as one 
that examined mock jurors’ impressions of a therapist’s actions in light 
of the possibility that the therapist’s patient may pose a harm to other 
                                                                                                                      
104 Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hind-
sight, 19 Law & Hum. Behav. 89, 93 (1995). 
105 Id. at 98. 
106 Id. Two of the major limitations of the Kamin-Rachlinski study are that the sample 
size was small and that no deliberations took place. See id. at 94–98. 
107 Casper et al., supra note 72, at 294–97. 
108 Id. at 298–99. The reverse halo effect, defined later in this Article, may have played 
a role in that determination as well. See infra note 214 and accompanying text. 
109 Casper et al., supra note 72, at 296. 
110 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
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people.111 As predicted, subjects rated the therapist’s actions as less rea-
sonable and more negligent when told that the patient later became 
violent toward others, and they viewed the violence as more foreseeable 
when they believed that it had actually occurred.112 Though many of 
the mock juror studies on hindsight bias examined only individuals ra-
ther than groups, group deliberations do not eliminate the risk of 
hindsight bias because the problem of group polarization reduces the 
potential debiasing effects that might arise from open debate.113 
 In the intellectual property arena, one of the key studies of mock 
jurors and hindsight bias was performed by Gregory Mandel, whose 
empirical work focused on individuals’ interpretations of the non-
obviousness requirement of patent law.114 The study examined this par-
ticular requirement because of its central importance in patent cases, 
in which it is the most frequently litigated issue related to the validity of 
patents and the one most likely to cause a patent to be invalidated.115 
The law student subjects in Mandel’s study each received one of two 
hypothetical fact patterns, as well as (1) data about the field of an in-
vention, (2) a set of prior art information, and (3) details about a prob-
lem on which an inventor was working.116 In the hindsight condition, 
subjects also received a one-sentence addition stating that the inventor 
had come up with a solution and explaining what that solution was; in 
the third condition (the so-called “debiasing” one), the study explained 
the issue of hindsight to subjects and advised them not to fall prey to 
                                                                                                                      
111 See Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinations of Negligence and the Hindsight Bias, 
20 Law & Hum. Behav. 501, 507 (1996). 
112 Id. at 507, 509–10. 
113 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 571, 587 n.76 (1998). One obstacle to debiasing which remains is that “[e]ven 
when people understand the existence of cognitive biases on a theoretical level, they still 
tend to believe that their own judgment remains unaffected.” Cassandra Burke Robertson, 
Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 1, 11 (2009) (citing Cynthia McPher-
son Frantz, I AM Being Fair: The Bias Blind Spot as a Stumbling Block to Seeing Both Sides, 28 
Basic & Applied Soc. Psychol. 157, 161–63 (2006) (failing to correct a bias in judgment 
toward character profiles the subjects indicated they personally liked)). Some scholars 
have hypothesized that hindsight bias is related to both a need for predictability and the 
desire to protect self-presentation. See, e.g., Jennifer D. Campbell & Abraham Tesser, Moti-
vational Interpretations of Hindsight Bias: An Individual Difference Analysis, 51 J. Personality 
605, 607 (1983). 
114 Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration That the Hindsight 
Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 Ohio St. L.J. 1391, 1406–20(2006). 
115 Id. at 1398 (citing John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity 
of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 208–09 (1998)). 
116 Mandel, supra note 114, at 1406. 
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it.117 There was a wide chasm between the foresight and hindsight con-
ditions for each of the two fact patterns (24% versus 76%, and 23% ver-
sus 59%, respectively), and the debiasing condition had only a marginal 
effect on skewed reasoning.118 
2. Judges and Bias 
 Judges face their own set of challenges in decision making,119 in-
cluding the hindsight bias discussed for juries. In a study of 167 judges, 
one team of researchers examined judicial behavior along five cognitive 
biases (anchoring, framing, hindsight bias, the representativeness heu-
ristic, and egocentric biases) and found that although judges were a bit 
less likely to fall prey to two of them (framing effects and the representa-
tiveness heuristic, which means “ignoring important background statis-
tical information in favor of individuating information”), all five cogni-
tive biases had a strong impact on their decision making.120 The 
research on hindsight bias and judges has not been replicated in every 
setting. Whereas some scholars view the general evidence as indicating 
the existence of hindsight bias in judicial determinations of probable 
cause,121 at least one study found no bias between foresight and hind-
sight conditions in that particular context.122 Specifically, the study’s au-
thors found that although hindsight did affect judges’ performance in 
predicting the probable outcome of a search, it did not sway their legal 
determinations.123 This work potentially suggests that the degree of 
                                                                                                                      
 
117 Id. at 1407–08. 
118 Id. at 1409. Mandel also discusses a number of reasons why his study may actually 
underestimate the true amount of hindsight bias. Id. 
119 See generally Anthony Champagne & Stuart Nagel, The Psychology of Judging, in The 
Psychology of the Courtroom, supra note 75, at 257 (discussing judges’ cognitive proc-
essing). 
120 Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 777, 784, 816 
(2001). The same authors also examined the effect of specialization in a study of bank-
ruptcy judges and found that these judges do at least as well as generalist judges, but that 
their political views are more strongly linked to some case outcomes; the authors con-
cluded that specialization may engender a side effect of politicization. Jeffrey Rachlinski et 
al., Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 1227, 1230–31 (2006). 
121 See Andrew E. Taslitz & James Coleman, Foreword: The Death of Probable Cause, Law & 
Contemp. Probs., Summer 2010, at i, viii. 
122 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Probable Cause, Probability, and Hindsight 5 (Vanderbilt Pub. 
Law Research Paper, Paper No. 11-25), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1877125. The authors “suspect that in actual cases, judges would find it much 
more difficult to suppress damning evidence against a defendant that they strongly believe to 
be guilty than they would in [the] hypothetical scenarios.” Id. at 26. 
123 Id. at 24; see also Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? 
The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251, 1323 (2005) (discussing a 
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hindsight bias that judges (and perhaps juries) exhibit could be some-
what context-dependent, although the weight of the empirical evidence 
does suggest that the likelihood of finding differences between foresight 
and hindsight conditions is fairly large.124 
 Judges also struggle when trying to live up to or impose standards 
of reasonableness. For instance, for the most significant dispositive mo-
tions of summary judgment, judges are supposed to dismiss cases if no 
reasonable jury would be able to find for the plaintiff.125 Suja Thomas 
argues, however, that what judges do is in fact—impermissibly— substi-
tute their own judgment of the facts for any genuine analysis of what a 
reasonable jury would do.126 Thomas bases this conclusion on numer-
ous factors, including that judges frequently disagree about what juries 
would find and that judges seem to interchangeably analyze what a sin-
gle juror—as opposed to an actual jury—would find, which may lead to 
a different outcome due to group decision-making dynamics.127 In the 
end, Thomas believes that the entire enterprise of deciding dispositive 
motions based on the reasonable jury standard is fatally flawed.128 
 If a party appeals the decision of a trial court judge, the appellate 
court will at times examine the judge’s behavior for abuse of discretion 
and ask “if no reasonable judge could logically make that decision.”129 
Of course, appellate judges at any level are subject to similar biases as 
trial court judges. At every level of decision making, there is thus a ten-
sion between, on the one hand, the mandate to act reasonably and as-
sess the actors below based on objective criteria, and, on the other 
hand, the pervasive cognitive biases that permeate attempts to engage 
                                                                                                                      
previous study by the same authors that suggested a lack of hindsight bias in some settings, 
but also a general inability on the part of judges to disregard relevant inadmissible evi-
dence). 
124 See supra notes 93–121 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of hind-
sight bias in a wide variety of scenarios). 
125 Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 759, 759 (2009) 
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). 
126 Id. at 769. This is somewhat analogous to the criticism in the patent context that the 
Federal Circuit at times substitutes its own judgment for that of district courts, which re-
sults in problems such as inconsistent and panel-specific decisions. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lef-
stin, The Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminacy, and Interpretation at the Federal Circuit, 58 
Hastings L.J. 1025, 1026–27 (2007); Lauren Maida, Note, Patent Claim Construction: It’s Not 
a Pure Matter of Law, So Why Isn’t the Federal Circuit Giving the District Courts the Deference They 
Deserve?, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1773, 1773–74 (2009). 
127 Thomas, supra note 125, at 770–73. 
128 See id. at 784. 
129 Richard M. Markus, A Better Standard for Reviewing Discretion, 2004 Utah L. Rev. 
1279, 1279. This has, in turn, been interpreted to mean that the outcome must blatantly 
violate fact and logic for the standard to be met. Id. at n.3. 
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in either of these actions. The hope of the judicial system is that the 
biases of different actors will be eliminated or at least sufficiently re-
duced as a case makes its way through the appellate process. For a vari-
ety of reasons, however, many cases are never appealed.130 Further, 
numerous decisions (such as a jury’s determination about a set of facts) 
are subject to such a high standard of review—and setting aside deci-
sions below increases the strain on limited judicial resources by such a 
large amount—that they are effectively likely to be set aside only a small 
percentage of the time whether they are “reasonable” or not.131 Appel-
late decisions that set aside judicial decisions below can be equally 
problematic; after all, disagreements between a higher and a lower 
court result in an outcome in which the lower court judge or judges are 
declared unreasonable, but “[o]utside of some finding of impropriety 
or mental disability . . . judges should be considered reasonable fact-
finders.”132 One could argue that even a reasonable fact finder can 
have an unreasonable moment or make a poor decision in a case with-
out being globally “unreasonable.” At the same time, another possibility 
presents itself: that different reasonable decisionmakers could arrive at 
different outcomes. This possibility will fail to be acknowledged in a 
universe in which an appellate judge actually asks herself, explicitly or 
implicitly, only what she thinks about the evidence. Kahan and his coau-
thors have advocated for humility on the part of each judge: 
[Before a judge decides] that no reasonable juror could find 
such facts, the judge should try to imagine who those poten-
tial jurors might be. If, as will usually be true, she cannot iden-
tify them, or can conjure only the random faces of imaginary 
statistical outliers, she should proceed to decide the case 
summarily. But if instead she can form a concrete picture of 
the dissenting jurors, and they are people who bear recogniz-
able identity-defining characteristics—demographic, cultural, 
political, or otherwise—she should stop and think hard. Due 
humility obliges her to consider whether privileging her own 
view of the facts risks conveying a denigrating and exclusion-
                                                                                                                      
130 One study estimates both the appeals rate and the reversal rate for federal civil tri-
als (for both judge and jury trials) to be about twenty-one percent. Kevin M. Clermont & 
Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: Defendants’ Advantage, 3 Am. L. & Econ. 
Rev. 125, 130 (2001). 
131 Markus, supra note 129, at 1282. 
132 Thomas, supra note 125, at 781. 
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ary message to members of such subcommunities. If it does, 
she should choose a different path.133 
This approach raises the question of why individual (rather than group-
based) idiosyncrasies should necessarily be equated with a higher like-
lihood of unreasonableness—lest we simply define reasonableness as 
the average or median view. Moreover, even if one was willing to com-
pletely embrace Kahan and his coauthors’ framework, there are signifi-
cant reasons to question whether and how judges could engage in the 
complex mental exercise that they propose.134 Despite these difficul-
ties, the proposal deserves respect for attempting to grapple with one 
of society’s oldest and most complex problems: how to bridge the inter-
subjective gap. 
                                                                                                                     
 Indeed, in the end, judges and juries likely struggle with more sim-
ilar problems than different ones. The high rate of judge-jury agree-
ment in both the criminal and civil jury literatures provides some pos-
sible evidence that a number of the difficulties in decision making arise 
from causes unrelated to the dyads of professional versus amateur judg-
ing and of individual versus group decision making.135 For instance, in 
Kalven and Zeisel’s research for the University of Chicago Jury Project, 
judges disagreed with the findings of criminal juries only about 20% of 
the time.136 The differences generally arose from greater leniency on 
the part of juries,137 and Kalven remarked separately that the observed 
degree of difference was such as to confirm the quality of the jury’s 
work but still allowed it “to perform a distinctive function.”138 Another 
team of researchers partially replicated the Kalven-Zeisel study based 
on data from 300 criminal trials in four locales and found over 70% 
 
133 Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 21, at 898–99. 
134 One scholar argues that Kahan asks judges for the impossible, and that “there is no 
evidence that judges have the ability to put aside their views and assess evidence based on 
another person’s or group’s viewpoint.” Thomas, supra note 125, at 780. Related proposals 
are similarly problematic. For instance, one scholar has proposed jury instructions that 
would have jurors switch in their heads the genders, races, and/or sexual orientations of 
defendants and victims to identify whether bias is entering their determinations. LEE, supra 
note 77, at 252–53. This proposal would create a number of complications: it would be 
difficult to apply and would increase the risk that jurors would engage in various forms of 
stereotyping. Caroline Forell, Homicide and the Unreasonable Man, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
597, 613–14 (2004) (reviewing Lee, supra note 77). 
135 See infra notes 136–140 and accompanying text. 
136 Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 81, at 59. 
137 Robert J. MacCoun & Norbert L. Kerr, Asymmetric Influence in Mock Jury Deliberation: 
Jurors’ Bias for Leniency, 54 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 21, 30 (1988) (identifying 
group deliberations as a factor in the increased leniency of juries over judges). 
138 Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 Va. L. Rev. 1055, 1064 (1964). 
2012] Reasonable Copyright 1329 
judge-jury agreement.139 Further, another study found a rate of agree-
ment of just over 71% for criminal cases (with the vast majority of the 
disagreement stemming from jury acquittals) and nearly 63% for civil 
cases (with an even split in the direction of the disagreement).140 
 In a broad review of the empirical literature that compares judges 
and juries across different settings, one scholar concluded that 
the decisionmaking of judges and jurors is strikingly similar. 
While there is evidence of some differences, there is a high 
degree of agreement between the groups, they appear to de-
cide real cases quite similarly, and they show a great deal of 
similarity in responding to simulated cases designed to exam-
ine a variety of legal decisionmaking processes.141 
She cautioned, however, that the high rates of agreement between the 
two groups were not guarantees of the accuracy of legal decisions by 
judges and juries.142 Indeed, we know that they both at times make 
similar types of errors that could result in agreement, including in mat-
ters such as the proper interpretation of scientific and statistical infor-
mation or as attempts to ignore inadmissible evidence.143 The next Part 
shows how the characteristics of copyrightable materials and related 
laws are such that both judges and juries are likely to struggle with ap-
plying copyright’s version of the reasonable man standard.144 The haz-
ards of cognitive bias reach dangerous heights in the context of ambigu-
ous subject matters, and the attempt to cling to an officially objective 
standard may lead to the least objective outcome of them all. 
                                                                                                                      
139 Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication 
of Kalven and Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 171, 173 (2005). 
140 Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its Meaning 
and Its Effect, 18 Law & Hum. Behav. 29, 48 (1994). 
141 Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges: A Benchmark for 
Judging?, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 469, 502 (2005). 
142 Id. at 505. 
143 Id. Other scholars have suggested that “[j]udges are likely to make better decisions 
in certain circumstances because their training and experience will enable them to avoid 
the more pernicious effects of such cognitive decision-making phenomena as the repre-
sentativeness heuristic.” Guthrie et al., supra note 118, at 827. They have recognized, how-
ever, that “group decision making or the insulation afforded by a judicial gatekeeper may 
enable juries to make better decisions than judges in other circumstances.” Id.; see also 
Jeffrey Kerwin & David R. Shaffer, Mock Jurors Versus Mock Juries: The Role of Deliberations in 
Reactions to Inadmissible Testimony, 20 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 153, 159–60 
(1994) (finding that mock juries followed judicial instructions to ignore inadmissible tes-
timony better than individual mock jurors). 
144 See infra notes 145–252 and accompanying text. 
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II. The Reasonable Man and Copyright Law 
 As Part I shows, legal decision making by both judges and juries 
can suffer from some degree of cognitive bias and related distor-
tions.145 These effects, however, take on a special significance in copy-
right law. First, the old adage “de gustibus et coloribus non est disputandum” 
(“there is no arguing about tastes and colors”) is nowhere more recog-
nized than in areas such as art, music, and literature. Nevertheless, 
copyright lawsuits leave attorneys and legal decisionmakers with no 
choice but to argue about matters usually left to personal taste. One of 
the goals of this Article is to issue a call to remind ourselves of the in-
herent subjectivity of the decision-making enterprise. Indeed, though 
copyright law has made repeated attempts to remain value-neutral, the 
boundary between aesthetic and legal determinations is elusive.146 This 
Part shows how most courts have decided to handle the various com-
plex elements of copyright infringement, and then discusses the prob-
lems that ambiguity and cognitive biases raise in this context.147 Section 
A explores the various tests for copyright infringement used by differ-
ent U.S. Courts of Appeals.148 Section B argues that the ambiguity of 
copyright law prevents judges and juries from applying these tests con-
sistently.149 Section C discusses how cognitive biases are likely to affect 
judges’ and juries’ analyses of copyright infringement.150 
                                                                                                                     
A. The Tests for Copyright Infringement 
1. Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Infringement 
 A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of copyright infringe-
ment by proving ownership of a valid copyright and a violation of one or 
more of the plaintiff’s exclusive rights listed under 17 U.S.C. § 106.151 
 
 
145 See supra notes 36–144 and accompanying text. 
146 See Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 247, 249 
(1998); see also Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 Tul. L. Rev. 805, 808 (2005) (argu-
ing that courts are regularly forced to confront the question of “what is art?”); Barton 
Beebe, Bleistein; or, Intellectual Property Law and the Problem of Aesthetic Progress (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that “intellectual property law has 
refused to reconcile the law’s fundamental purpose, the promotion of progress, with the 
aesthetic”). 
147 See infra notes 151–252 and accompanying text. 
148 See infra notes 151–192 and accompanying text. 
149 See infra notes 193–203 and accompanying text. 
150 See infra notes 204–252 and accompanying text. 
151 The statute provides: 
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Unless the defendant challenges the validity of the plaintiff’s copyright, 
typically by arguing that the work is not one that is protectable under 
copyright law, the issue will be whether or not the defendant violated 
one or more of the plaintiff’s exclusive rights. In cases in which the 
plaintiff alleges that the defendant made an unlawful reproduction of 
the plaintiff’s work, the plaintiff must show proof of copying.152 Such 
copying can be proven either by direct or, more frequently, indirect 
(circumstantial) evidence.153 “[W]here there are striking similarities 
probative of copying, proof of access may be inferred.”154 Proving copy-
ing through evidence of access and/or similarities establishes so-called 
“probative similarity.”155 The understanding is that “if the defendant 
had access to the plaintiff’s work and the defendant’s work is similar 
enough to the plaintiff’s, the most plausible inference is that the defen-
dant actually copied from the plaintiff.”156 Copying itself, however, is not 
necessarily illegal, and replicating de minimis amounts of copyrightable 
materials is not actionable.157 Rather, the copying must have been “sub-
stantial” to be infringing; this represents “one of the most difficult ques-
                                                                                                                      
 Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of the copyright under this 
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: 
 (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
 (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
 (3)to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
 (4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform 
the copyrighted work publicly; 
 (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the indi-
vidual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the 
copyrighted work publicly; and 
 (6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work pub-
licly by means of a digital audio transmission. 
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
152 See, e.g., Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Laureyssens v. Idea 
Grp, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 139–40 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
153 See Lemley, supra note 23, at 719. 
154 Repp, 132 F.3d at 889 (citing Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 471 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
155 Id. at n.1. The term “probative similarity” is often attributed to Alan Latman. See gener-
ally Alan Latman, “Probative Similarity” as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copy-
right Infringement, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1187 (1990) (urging the adoption of the term “proba-
tive similarity” as a term separate from “substantial similarity” in the proof-of-copying step of 
copyright infringement). 
156 Lemley, supra note 23, at 720. 
157 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 n.34 (1984). 
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tions in copyright law, and one that is the least susceptible of helpful 
generalizations.”158 
2. The Traditional Test—Arnstein v. Porter 
 To determine whether substantial similarity is present, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit developed a two-step test for 
copyright infringement that most other circuits have followed in some 
form.159 The Second Circuit created this test in the 1946 case Arnstein v. 
Porter, in which Ira Arnstein accused his fellow songwriter Cole Porter 
of ripping off Arnstein’s compositions for several successful songs.160 
The court held that, as a first step, “[i]f there is evidence of access and 
similarities exist, then the trier of the facts must determine whether the 
similarities are sufficient to prove copying. On this issue, analysis (‘dis-
section’) is relevant, and the testimony of experts may be received to 
aid the trier of the facts.”161 Some scholars have remarked that the first 
step of this analysis has lost much of its weight since the advent of the 
Internet because now most materials are easily available, and hence 
access can virtually be assumed.162 If the first prong of the test is no 
longer a barrier in many cases, this only emphasizes the need to employ 
a proper analysis under the second prong. 
 Under Arnstein, if the court establishes that copying took place, it 
must next decide whether the copying was illicit and thus constituted 
unlawful appropriation.163 The answer to this question is determined 
by examining the response of the ordinary observer, so neither dissec-
tion nor expert testimony is considered relevant.164 The essential in-
quiry for the second step in Arnstein was “whether defendant took from 
                                                                                                                      
158 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03[A] 
(2011). 
159 This Subsection and those that follow present a basic overview of the key tests that 
courts have used to determine copyright infringement. See generally Robert C. Osterberg 
& Eric C. Osterberg, Substantial Similarity in Copyright Law ch. 3 (2011) (provid-
ing a more detailed discussion of the specific tests used in each circuit). 
160 154 F.2d 464, 467–68 (2d Cir. 1946). 
161 Id. at 468. 
162 See, e.g., Bartow, supra note 23, at 84 (citing Karen Bevill, Note, Copyright Infringement 
and Access: Has the Access Requirement Lost its Probative Value?, 52 Rutgers L. Rev. 311, 311–
12 (1999). 
163 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
164 Id. There is some disagreement as to what the Arnstein court meant to state on this 
subject, but this is how Arnstein has historically been interpreted. See Lemley, supra note 23, 
at 722; see also Stephanie J. Jones, Music Copyright in Theory and Practice: An Improved Ap-
proach for Determining Substantial Similarity, 31 Duq. L. Rev. 277, 285–90 (1993) (providing 
more information on this subject). 
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plaintiff’s works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, 
who comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed, 
that defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to 
the plaintiff.”165 It is telling that the test was not without controversy 
from the start, with the dissenting judge in Arnstein stating that “after 
repeated hearings of the records, I could not find therein what my 
brothers found 166.”  
                                                                                                                     
3. The Krofft Approach 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also took a two-
step approach in 1977 in its leading case Sid & Marty Krofft Television 
Productions, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.167 The first step, which establishes 
probative similarity, is the “extrinsic” step through which courts exam-
ine a list of particular criteria to determine the substantial similarity of 
ideas with the aid of expert testimony and analytic dissection.168 For the 
determination of unlawful appropriation, the court refers to an “intrin-
sic” step, which looks at “the response of the ordinary reasonable per-
son” to determine the substantial similarity of expression; at this stage, 
the court prohibits the use of expert testimony or dissection.169 
 The primary difference between the Ninth Circuit’s two-step analy-
sis and the Second Circuit’s test, aside from the Ninth Circuit’s “focus 
on the comparison of ideas as well as expression,”170 is “that the Ninth 
Circuit puts more emphasis than the Second on the ordinary observer 
side of the analysis—what it calls the ‘intrinsic’ inquiry.”171 Additionally, 
“courts that follow Krofft are more willing to treat as the ‘ordinary ob-
server’ the likely customer of the copyrighted products, which may or 
may not be a member of the jury.”172 As a result, when the intended au-
 
 
165 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473. 
166 Id. at 476 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
167 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977), superseded by statute on other grounds, 17 U.S.C. 
§ 504(b) (2006). 
168 Id. 
169 Id. The District of Oregon offers a recent application of the Krofft test. See Erickson 
v. Blake, 839 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1135–40 (D. Or. 2012) (dismissing a copyright infringement 
case—in which the plaintiff-owner of the work “Pi Symphony” argued that the defendant’s 
work, “What Pi Sounds Like,” infringed when both transposed the digits of the number pi 
to music—by holding that pi was a non-copyrightable fact and that the idea to transpose its 
digits to music was also non-copyrightable). 
170 Lemley, supra note 23, at 724. 
171 Id. at 725. 
172 Id. at 729; see also Austin Padgett, Note, The Rhetoric of Predictability: Reclaiming the Lay 
Ear in Music Copyright Infringement Litigation, 7 Pierce L. Rev. 125, 132 (2008) (discussing 
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dience is an “extraordinary observer,” courts may allow expert testi-
mony, although generally prohibited under the intrinsic test, to help 
legal decisionmakers understand specialists’ perspectives.173 
4. Other Methods 
 Although most circuits have adopted either the Arnstein or the 
Krofft test, courts have occasionally changed or modified these ap-
proaches under certain circumstances. 
a. The Shaw v. Lindheim Modification of the Krofft Approach 
 In 1990, in Shaw v. Lindheim, the Ninth Circuit tried to clarify the 
relationship between substantial similarity and the idea-expression di-
chotomy by changing the two-step test from Krofft.174 In the years after 
Krofft, district courts began to refer to a standardized list of elements 
when they applied Krofft’s extrinsic step to literary works.175 As a result 
of this “checklist of elements” approach, the Shaw court felt that the 
extrinsic test was “more sensibly described as an objective . . . analysis of 
expression, having strayed from Krofft’s division between expression 
and ideas.”176 With respect to the intrinsic test, the court viewed it as a 
subjective test of expression, leaving the original Krofft conception un-
changed.177 One observer concluded that “Shaw’s emphasis on compar-
ing copied expression, not ideas, is thoroughly consistent with the idea-
expression distinction and the constitutional principles of copyright 
law.”178 
 The Shaw court also held that, when it comes to summary judg-
ment, “satisfaction of the extrinsic test creates a triable issue of fact in a 
[literary] copyright action.”179 Thus, once the plaintiff meets the ex-
trinsic test, proving an objective similarity of expression, “it is improper 
                                                                                                                      
the Fourth Circuit’s analysis of the ordinary observer in Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 
F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1990)). 
173 Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 857 (6th Cir. 2003). 
174 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990); Thomas M. Cunningham, Note, Extending 
Shaw v. Lindheim: Substantial Similarity and the Idea-Expression Distinction in Copyright of Non-
Literary Subject Matter, 55 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 239, 242, 248 (1993). 
175 Cunningham, supra note 174, at 248. 
176 Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1357. 
177 Id. Although the Shaw court’s holding was limited to literary works, the Ninth Cir-
cuit applied it to a computer program copyright as well because of the parallels it drew 
between some such programs and literary works. See Brown Bag Software v. Symantec 
Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1476 (9th Cir. 1992). 
178 Cunningham, supra note 174, at 249. 
179 Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1359. 
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for a court to find . . . that there is no substantial similarity as a matter 
of law.”180 This part of the test is supposed to ensure that the plaintiff 
will get to the jury once an objective showing of similarity has been 
made and to prevent judges from “arbitrarily decid[ing] the infringe-
ment question on the basis of their own subjective opinions.”181 The 
terminology gets rather confusing here because the court talks about 
the second step of Krofft, which seeks to determine “the response of the 
ordinary reasonable person”182 (normally considered an objective test), 
as a subjective determination that is “no more suitable for a judge than 
for a jury.”183 The tension in terminology is rather telling because the 
court is conflating what the jury subjectively experiences with what the 
hypothetical ordinary observer himself would perceive. 
 The jury instructions used in various circuits prove illuminating on 
this last point. Some of them ask jurors to determine what an “ordinary 
reasonable person” would find substantially similar,184 whereas others 
make no reference to the reasonable person and tell jurors to determine 
whether two works are substantially similar in the abstract,185 and yet oth-
ers speak of the “average lay observer” but equate that concept with the 
jurors themselves.186 The current approaches to substantial similarity 
                                                                                                                      
 
180 Id. 
181 Cunningham, supra note 174, at 251. 
182 Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1358 (citing Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164). 
183 Id. at 1360. 
184 See, e.g., Susan Wakeen Doll Co. v. Ashton-Drake Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 453 n.1 
(7th Cir. 2001) (“Defendant’s sculpture is ‘substantially similar’ to plaintiff’s copyright if 
an ordinary reasonable person, unless he or she set out to detect disparities between the 
plaintiff’s and defendant’s sculptures, would be disposed to overlook the disparities and 
regard their aesthetic appeal as the same.”); Cartier v. Jackson, 59 F.3d 1046, 1049–50 
(10th Cir. 1995) (“In applying [the subjective or intrinsic] test, you must decide or deter-
mine whether an ordinary, reasonable, non-expert person would conclude that the total 
concept and feel of [the defendant’s song] is substantially similar to the total concept and 
feel of [the plaintiff’s song].”); see also Osterberg & Osterberg, supra note 159, app. B 
(collecting these and other jury instructions). 
185 See, e.g., Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1564 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992) (“Substantial similarity may exist where an important part of the mask work is 
copied, even though the percentage of the entire chip which is copied may be relatively 
small.”). 
186 See, e.g., Osterberg & Osterberg, supra note 159, app. B, at B-3 (citing Gaste v. 
Kaiserman, 683 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d 863 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1988)) (“Substan-
tial similarity means that the average lay observer would recognize the alleged infringing 
work as having been derived from the copyrighted work. . . . [W]hat it requires . . . as lay 
listeners, that is as non-professional listeners, [is that] you would recognize the one as hav-
ing been derived from the other.”). Though one must exercise caution in generalizing, 
some previous research indicates that juries spend little time discussing standards of proof, 
which may affect how they process these types of instructions in the copyright context as 
well. Hastie et al., supra note 75, at 86–87. The research on jurors’ general comprehen-
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developed in Arnstein and Krofft thus not only are problematic from a 
cognitive perspective in the ways described in this Article,187 but also are 
applied inconsistently as evidenced by the jury instructions we see.188 
                                                                                                                     
b. Software Cases 
 One clear exception to the two-step analyses in Arnstein and Krofft 
are software cases, in which courts usually allow expert testimony not 
only on the question of copying, but also on misappropriation.189 In 
1992, in Computer Associates International v. Altai, Inc., the Second Circuit 
stated that it would “leave it to the discretion of the district court to de-
cide to what extent, if any, expert opinion, regarding the highly techni-
cal nature of computer programs, is warranted in a given case.”190 The 
Altai court also adopted an “abstraction-filtration-comparison” frame-
work for evaluating substantial similarity.191 I mention the software doc-
trine here because, as I will discuss below, Mark Lemley has proposed 
that courts adopt a similar framework for non-software copyright in-
fringement cases.192 
B. The Problem of Ambiguity in Copyright Infringement Cases 
 The subject matters that copyright law covers inherently involve 
complex human responses before litigation even enters the picture. 
Having jurors and judges apply difficult and at times confusing tests to 
already vague materials means that they will often have to make deci-
 
sion of jury instructions raises concerns in its own right, with many jurors failing to com-
pletely understand instructions despite expressing great confidence in their own under-
standing but diminished confidence in their fellow jurors’. See Shari Seidman Diamond, 
What Jurors Think: Expectations and Reactions of Citizens Who Serve as Jurors, in Verdict: As-
sessing the Civil Jury System, supra note 64, at 282, 295–97; see also James R.P. Ogloff & 
V. Gordon Rose, The Comprehension of Judicial Instructions, in Psychology and Law: An 
Empirical Perspective 407, 425–26, 434–38 (Neil Brewer & Kipling D. Williams eds., 
2005) (noting similar problems and suggesting solutions to improve jurors’ understanding 
of instructions). 
187 See infra notes 204–251 and accompanying text. 
188 The American Bar Association (ABA) has sought to remedy some of the issues di-
rectly related to jury instructions by publishing a book of model instructions. See generally 
ABA Intellectual Prop. Litig. Comm., Model Jury Instructions: Copyright, Trade-
mark and Trade Dress Litigation (Todd S. Holbrook & Alan Nathan Harris eds., 2009) 
(providing model jury instructions for a variety of intellectual property issues). 
189 Lemley, supra note 23, at 740. 
190 982 F.2d 693, 713 (2d Cir. 1992). 
191 Id. at 706. 
192 See infra notes 253–288 and accompanying text. 
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sions permeated by ambiguity.193 Judge Learned Hand’s pronounce-
ment quoted at the beginning of this Article, stating that copyright in-
fringement tests are bound to be vague,194 continues to reverberate af-
ter over fifty years.195 One notable indication of the fact-specific nature 
of substantial similarity inquiries is courts’ explicit reluctance to grant 
summary judgment in these cases. In copyright infringement cases, 
courts have stated that “granting summary judgment, particularly in 
favor of the defendant, is a practice to be used sparingly.”196 The main 
reason for this is that “substantial similarity is customarily an extremely 
close question of fact.”197 One scholar has argued that the concept of 
substantial similarity itself has become more, rather than less, ambigu-
ous as it has been subjected to judicial interpretation over the years.198 
The psychology literature on ambiguous decisions may shed some light 
as to the problems that judges and jurors face in copyright cases and 
may help to explain the outcomes of related litigation. 
 Ambiguity has long presented special problems in the context of 
cognitive bias and the law.199 “[O]bserver effects are most potent where 
ambiguity is greatest, when an observer’s judgment is most likely to 
succumb to expectation, subjective preference, or external utility.”200 
For instance, individuals tend to act with an overabundance of caution 
in ambiguous situations, even when they can fairly accurately assess 
                                                                                                                      
193 Of course, vagueness is a problem in a number of areas of the law, including statu-
tory interpretation. See generally Ralf Poscher, Ambiguity and Vagueness in Legal Interpretation, 
in Oxford Handbook on Language and Law 128 (Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. 
Solan eds., 2012) (discussing the role of vagueness in the legal system). 
194 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). 
195 According to a Westlaw search that I conducted, Judge Hand’s pronouncement was 
later quoted by twenty other cases. As a related matter, when Judge Jon Newman on the 
Second Circuit suggested that an “ordinary observer” test be adopted to determine the 
copyrightability of a utilitarian article, Judge Walter Mansfield wrote in a majority opinion 
that the proposed test would be so vague as to constitute a “bottomless pit.” Carol Barn-
hart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419 n.5 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that manne-
quins of partial human torsos used to showcase clothing were utilitarian articles lacking 
artistic or aesthetic attributes that could be physically or conceptually separated from their 
utilitarian features and thus were not copyrightable). 
196 Kohus, 328 F.3d at 853 (quoting Wickham v. Knoxville Int’l Energy Exposition, Inc., 
739 F.2d 1094, 1097 (6th Cir. 1984)). 
197 Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing 
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468, 474). 
198 Cohen, supra note 23, at 722–23. 
199 See infra notes 200–203 and accompanying text. 
200 D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Fo-
rensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 16 (2002). 
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risk.201 As a result, juries act in a biased manner and place exaggerated 
demands on parties that face uncertainty; indeed, jurors will see the 
risks that a defendant took as greater than they were and will view them 
as more reckless if the risks were uncertain.202 This leads to a conun-
drum: “[S]ituations of ambiguity, in which precautionary behavior will 
be especially difficult because of the ill-defined character of the risks, 
should be judged by more lenient liability standards. But, to the con-
trary, juries will be inclined to be particularly harsh in situations of am-
biguity and uncertainty.”203 The question of substantial similarity can 
become confusing for even experienced attorneys and judges; this like-
ly translates into even greater confusion for artists who have to make 
decisions as to how to craft their works such as not to infringe. The 
empirical research casts concerns as to how judges and juries may ad-
judicate such situations of artistic uncertainty. 
C. Cognitive Bias and Copyright Infringement 
 This Section discusses how a number of cognitive biases are likely 
to affect judges’ and juries’ analyses of copyright infringement.204 It 
                                                                                                                      
201 Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 94, at 912–13. Some scholars have distinguished situa-
tions involving ambiguity and those involving risk such that “under ambiguity, the agent is 
unable to assign probabilities to states with absolute precision (as would be the case under 
risk) but is able to assign ‘best-guess’ probabilities to such states.” Ian M. Dobbs, A Bayesian 
Approach to Decision-Making Under Ambiguity, 58 Economica 417, 417 (1991). As one scholar 
explains, “The essence of the distinction between situations involving pure risk and those 
involving ambiguity is that in the latter case new information may modify an individual’s 
estimation of best-guess probabilities, whereas in the former case it will not.” Id. That 
model shows that the anticipation of finding out an outcome that could produce a feeling 
of having previously “mis-evaluated may influence an individual’s ex ante assessment of a 
given action.” Id. at 418. This further illustrates the type of difference in decision-making 
strategies that ambiguity can produce. 
202 To some extent, this may parallel individuals’ and juries’ general distaste for par-
ticular types of cost-benefit calculations when physical harm is involved. For instance, law 
students were unwilling to accept a manufacturer’s failure to recall a car model as reason-
able even though the cost of the recall would have outweighed the expected costs in con-
sumers’ lives; the students’ discomfort was rooted in the deontological theory that there is 
a limit to the physical harm that individuals should ever have to suffer in exchange for 
private profit. Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 249, 255 (1996); 
see also Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 495, 505–06 
(1986) (noting that jurors were outraged when they learned that the same car manufac-
turer had performed a cost-benefit analysis in this context). 
203 Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 94, at 913. In some situations, such as in a number of 
tort-like settings, a party may be able “to reduce the ambiguity of a risk it is creating 
through monitoring, research, and experience.” Lempert, supra note 100, at 891. This is a 
more problematic proposition for the copyright context. 
204 See infra notes 206–252 and accompanying text. 
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focuses on the biases that are of particular relevance to this legal con-
text, but the list is not exhaustive—if anything, the issues caused by 
cognitive bias in copyright litigation are greater than what this Section 
indicates. Part III of this Article then lays out some solutions that will 







                                                                                                                     
1. indsight Bias 
 First, decisionmakers in copyright cases are at an elevated risk 
g prey to hindsight bias. As one scholar has cogently explained: 
As a structural matter, copyright lends itself almost perfectly 
to the possibility of hindsight bias. Since the existence and 
scope of the entitlement in a work are only ever decided when 
the defendant copies parts of it, the presence of actual copy-
ing (appropriation) tends to hurt the defendant’s case. In-
deed, as a historical matter, courts seem to have acknowl-
edged their reliance on hindsight with observations l
is worth copying is prima facie worth protecting.”  
To some extent, as several scholars have noted, “hindsight bias is in-
deed an inevitable consequence of any ex post liability and entitlement 
delineation process.”207 At the same time, other factors, such as the elu-
sive quest for the reasonable man208 and the emphasis on the two-step 
test for copyright infringement, may further exacerbate hindsight bias 
in this context. As previously discussed, judges and juries first deter-
 
205 See infra notes 253–288 and accompanying text. 
206 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1569, 
1631 (2009) (quoting Univ. of London Press, Ltd. v. Univ. Tutorial Press, Ltd., [1916] 2 Ch. 
601 at 610 (Eng.)). As Balganesh indicates, although U.S. courts have departed from this 
understanding, it remains illustrative of the ex post structural framework that underlies copy-
right law. Id. at 1631 n.236. A plaintiff and defendant are, on the other hand, likely to over-
emphasize mentally their unique contributions to their own works. See generally Michael Ross 
& Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution, 37 J. Personality & Soc. Psy-
chol. 322 (1979) (demonstrating across several experiments that subject populations as 
diverse as naturally occurring discussion groups, married couples, basketball teams, and 
groups assembled in a laboratory more easily recalled their own contributions to joint prod-
ucts and accepted more responsibility for a collective product than the rest of the respective 
group attributed to them). In the area of patent law, Mark Lemley has criticized the exagger-
ated role that society assigns to the contributions of “lone genius” inventors and has empha-
sized the nature of invention as a social rather than individual phenomenon. See Mark A. 
Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 709, 710–11 (2012). 
207 Balganesh, supra note 206, at 1631 (citing Rachlinski, supra note 113, at 571). 
208 See id.; supra notes 33–144 and accompanying text. 
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mine whether copying took place before reaching the question of 
whether the copying constituted misappropriation.209 Unlike trade-
mark infringement tests, which balance multiple factors to determine 
liability,210 copyright tests consist of a series of binary questions. Al-
though the law no longer officially accepts the idea mentioned above 
that something of value must have been taken if copying took place, a 
legal decisionmaker may draw conscious or subconscious conclusions 
from a determination of copying, which will increase the chance that 
e o
t, it appears that hindsight bias will result in pro-
                                                                                                                     
h r she will make a finding of substantial similarity. 
 For one, believing that a defendant copied may also lead to the 
implicit assumption that the copied material was not in the public do-
main (otherwise, it would not have needed to be copied from the 
plaintiff). Relatedly, if the assumption prevails that what was taken was 
somehow unique to the plaintiff’s work, any use of that material is likely 
to elicit impressions of free riding. Indeed, Lemley has shown that the 
use of free riding rhetoric has dramatically increased in intellectual 
property decisions over time,211 and he criticizes the “assumption on 
the part of courts that all enrichment derived from use of an intellec-
tual property right is necessarily unjust.”212 Olufunmilayo Arewa echoes 
this sentiment by noting a general misunderstanding of the concept of 
free riding in the copyright context and emphasizing that some degree 
of free riding in the form of borrowing is inevitable in musical expres-
sion.213 Problematic understandings of free riding that do not conform 
to the spirit of copyright law may be overcome in litigation, but we must 
take them seriously nonetheless because they can tip the balance in 
some cases if left unmonitored. On average, if the analysis in this Arti-
cle proves correc
plaintiff effects. 
 Relatedly, hindsight bias may be exacerbated by a version of the so-
called “reverse halo effect,” which refers to the issue that “once observ-
 
209 See supra notes 151–192 and accompanying text. 
210 See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) 
(delineating what has become the best-known trademark infringement test). 
211 Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1031, 
1039 (2005) (showing that variations of the term “free riding” were used in over 50% of all 
cases between 1983 and 2003, as compared to figures below 25% between 1943 and 1973). 
212 Id. at 1044. 
213 Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing, Porgy and Bess, 
and Unfair Use, 37 Rutgers L.J. 277, 341 (2006). This also dovetails with Jeanne Fromer’s 
description of the creative process and the fact that people want to see and hear works that 
are new but not overly so. Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. 1441, 1479–83 (2010). 
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ers (including jurors) hear of an isolated act of misconduct, they trans-
mute that act into a generally bad character, which deflects the jurors 
from fairly assessing the evidence.”214 Just as legal decisionmakers may 
infer that what was taken was worth taking, they may conclude that the 
type of person who is willing to copy from others is also the type who is 
willing to do so in a way that is unlawful. Some of this is rooted in what 
Arewa considers a misunderstanding of the creative process, as men-
tioned above.215 Further, as Ann Bartow has indicated, “[a]ccusations 
related to acts of copying carry a surfeit of negative connotations. If one 
copies answers from the exam of the student sitting in the next chair, 
one is a cheater; if one copies the words of others into one’s essay with-
out appropriate attribution, one is a plagiarist.”216 She also states that 
people believe “that the very act of copying exudes an aura of actionable 
evil.”217 Although most scholars would draw numerous distinctions be-
tween the act of copyright infringement and that of plagiarism,218 not 
all would.219 Additionally, the lay jury is more likely to lump some of 
these actions together, especially if directly encouraged to do so by 
plaintiffs’ attorneys. Bartow’s recommendation that legal decisionmak-
ers “repress any visceral negative emotional reactions that acts of copy-
ing provoke in them”220 is thus unlikely to overcome the reverse halo 
effect given that the bias largely operates at the subconscious level. 
A
                                                                                                                     
2. nchoring 
 Another bias that likely enters the equation in copyright-related 
decision making is a type of anchoring. Anchoring generally “refers to 
the tendency for arbitrary set points to influence judgment.”221 In the 
case of copyrighted materials, jurors or judges are asked to compare an 
 
214 David A. Sonenshein, Circuit Roulette: The Use of Prior Convictions to Impeach Credibility 
in Civil Cases Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 279, 297 (1988) (cita-
tion omitted). 
215 See Arewa, supra note 213, at 341. 
216 Bartow, supra note 23, at 84 (citation omitted). 
217 Id. at 93. 
218 See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some Observa-
tions on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 Hastings L.J. 
167, 202 (2002); Ralph D. Mawdsley, The Tangled Web of Plagiarism Litigation: Sorting Out the 
Legal Issues, 2009 B.Y.U. Educ. & L.J. 245, 261. 
219 See, e.g., Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright Phi-
losophy and Ethics, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1278, 1290 (2003) (designating plagiarism and cop-
yright piracy as “conceptual cousin[s]”). 
220 Bartow, supra note 23, at 102. 
221 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and 
Cautious Supporters, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 739, 751 n.60 (2000). 
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allegedly infringing piece to the original, which may turn the original 
into an anchor. At least at the margins, decisionmakers are likely to 
overfocus on similarities to the original and gravitate toward a finding 
of liability, which again favors plaintiffs.222 Under the current test, and 
due to the way that materials are presented to decisionmakers, as long 
as the two pieces bear some degree of similarity (which they usually do 
to make it to this stage of litigation) they may be perceived as more 
strikingly similar as a result of anchoring than they ever would have if 
they had been encountered by observers outside the courtroom. This 
effect may be even stronger where the original work is displayed first in 
court, which is likely to take place the vast majority of the time. 
C
working hypothesis based on initial information that influences how 
                                                                                                                     
3. onfirmation Bias 
 Confirmation bias may also play a relevant role in the copyright 
infringement context, either in conjunction with anchoring or on its 
own. Confirmation bias has been defined as “the seeking or interpret-
ing of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, 
or a hypothesis in hand.”223 This bias has been observed in a number of 
legal contexts, including fingerprinting identification.224 In one study, 
most of the experts used as study subjects misidentified a set of finger-
prints as a nonmatch after being given erroneous contextual informa-
tion even though they were asked to regard that information as irrele-
vant.225 In copyright cases, legal decisionmakers tasked with examining 
the existence of substantial similarity may draw conclusions based on 
some similar traits between the original and allegedly infringing works 
and then interpret other traits as more similar than they would have 
but for these initial conclusions. The fact that the plaintiff presents his 
case first may exacerbate the pro-plaintiff effect that this bias potentially 
already has in copyright litigation. The so-called “irrational primacy 
effect” has been observed in other contexts in which subjects develop a 
 
222 Anchoring may also play a role in the determination of damages once there is a 
finding of liability. 
223 Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 
Rev. Gen. Psychol. 175, 175 (1998). 
224 Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Errone-
ous Identifications, 156 Forensic Sci. Int’l 74, 76 (2006). 
225 Id. 
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they view subsequent pieces of evidence;226 this effect may play a role 
here as well.227 
4. The Overconfidence Effect 
 One phenomenon has the potential to worsen all the biases de-
scribed above: the overconfidence effect. It causes individuals to exhibit 
greater confidence in their decision-making abilities than their actual 
accuracy warrants.228 We know that “[c]ognitive psychological research 
indicates that one of the best mechanisms for reducing overconfident 
judgments is forcing oneself to consider alternatives and carefully re-
view arguments against one’s position.”229 Though, as in all litigation, 
judges and jurors in copyright cases hear arguments from both sides, 
this issue remains particularly challenging in contexts in which deci-
sionmakers encounter the key evidence in a direct manner. As men-
tioned in the Introduction,230 in the 2007 U.S. Supreme Court case 
Scott v. Harris, the justices showed such great confidence in their judg-
ment because the relevant car chase was captured on video and they 
could see the evidence with their own eyes. When that is the case, indi-
viduals are likely to be less open-minded about counter-arguments, as 
one can surmise from some of the justices’ belief that anyone who 
watched the tape would draw the same conclusion as they did.231 As we 
know from Dan Kahan’s work, the justices’ confidence proved exces-
sive, and individuals from specific groups did disagree.232 
                                                                                                                      
226 Nickerson, supra note 223, at 187. 
227 The relationship between primacy and recency effects is complex, and the respec-
tive strengths of each are the subject of some debate; it is noteworthy, however, that in 
many jurisdictions, plaintiffs enjoy the benefits of both because they not only speak first 
when trials begin, but they also proceed first and last during the closing arguments phase. 
See John B. Mitchell, Why Should the Prosecutor Get the Last Word?, 27 Am. J. Crim. L. 139, 157 
n.42 (2000) (citing Michael F. Colby, Friendly Persuasion: Gaining Attention, Comprehension, 
and Acceptance in Court, 17 Trial 42, 46 (1981)); see also E. Allan Lind, The Psychology of 
Courtroom Procedure, in The Psychology of the Courtroom, supra note 75, at 13, 24–27 
(discussing the issue of the order of presentation of evidence). 
228 See, e.g., Gerry Pallier et al., The Role of Individual Differences in the Accuracy of Confi-
dence Judgments, 129 J. Gen. Psychol. 257, 258–59 (2002). 
229 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government 
Design, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 549, 588 (2002); see also Derek J. Koehler, Hypothesis Generation 
and Confidence in Judgment, 20 J. Experimental Psychol.: Learning, Memory, & Cogni-
tion 461, 466 (1994) (showing that subjects asked to generate hypotheses about an event 
were more likely to question a prespecified hypothesis). 
230 See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. 
231 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 n.5 (2007). 
232 See supra notes 67–72 and accompanying text (describing Kahan’s research). 
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 The overconfidence effect—which is “[o]ne of the most robust 
findings in the literature of individual decision making”233—has been 
shown across a variety of settings, and groups can exacerbate this type 
of bias.234 Overconfidence is particularly great when accurate judg-
ments are hard to make.235 This raises concerns in the copyright con-
text where, as discussed, much decision making takes place in the face 
of ambiguity.236 Overconfidence can serve as a compounding element 
for other cognitive biases and “magnifies the undesirable consequences 
of erroneous judgment.”237 Some research also shows that self-serving 
biases like overconfidence are actually exacerbated in decisionmakers 
who have some level of expertise.238 Indeed, this bias has been ob-
served in doctors, psychologists, lawyers, negotiators, engineers, and 
security ana 239lysts.  
                                                                                                                     
 Judges appear to fall prey to the overconfidence effect in a num-
ber of settings. When asked where they would place themselves in a 
ranking of judges across three dimensions (ability to assess the credibil-
ity of a witness, ability to avoid bias, and ability to facilitate settlement), 
over 83% of administrative law judges placed themselves in the top half, 
and none placed themselves in the bottom quartile.240 Similarly, in a 
study of magistrate judges which asked how high the judges’ appeal 
rate was, over 87% of subjects believed that their peers had higher re-
 
233 Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations 
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), in Behavioral Law and Eco-
nomics 144, 149 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). 
234 Id. at 150 (citing Chip Heath & Forest J. Jourden, Illusions, Disillusions and the Buffer-
ing Effects of Groups, 69 Organizational Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 103, 104–06 
(1997)). Overconfidence, like other cognitive biases, can be adaptive in some situations, 
which is likely why the effect persists despite its drawbacks. See Heath & Jourden, supra, at 
114. 
235 Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making 219 (1993). 
236 See supra notes 193–203 and accompanying text. 
237 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 1165, 1173 (2003). 
238 Id. at 1172–73. 
239 Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence, 
24 Cognitive Psychol. 411, 414 (1992) (explaining that overconfidence is established by 
the balance of arguments for and against the competing hypothesis without sufficient atten-
tion to the weight of the evidence). Two critics have quipped that the decision making of 
experts is “often wrong but rarely in doubt.” Id.; see Nathanael Fast et al., Power and Overconfi-
dent Decision-Making, Organizational Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes (forthcoming 
2012), available at http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~nathanaf/power_and_overconfident_decision_ 
making.pdf (discussing a set of studies on the relationship between subjects’ perception of 
their own power and their level of overconfidence). 
240 Chris Guthrie et al., The “Hidden Judiciary”: An Empirical Examination of Executive 
Branch Justice, 58 Duke L.J. 1477, 1519 (2009). 
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versal rates than themselves.241 This overconfidence likely permeates a 
wide variety of decision-making processes, and at least one scholar, Jef-
frey Rachlinski, has expressed concern that the new pleading standards 
set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2009 in Ashcroft v. Iqbal will re-
quire judges to exhibit a level of humility “that likely exists in no profes-
sional decision maker.”242 In particular, judges will have to evaluate at 
that early stage the degree of confidence that they possess in their own 
thoughts about how the case should continue; in light of the existing 
research, Rachlinski concludes that this will likely result in overconfi-
dence.243 The same effect extends to judges’ views of their own abilities 
to minimize racial bias, with 97% of judges rating their ability to avoid 
racially motivated decision making as better than that of their peers’.244 
Based on the weight of the evidence in these contexts, it is not a stretch 
to suspect strongly that judges view themselves as good or at least de-
cent decisionmakers in the copyright context and that their ability to 
view directly the most relevant evidence leaves little room for second-
guessing their skill level for making definitive judgments.245 
5. The Role of Other Attributes 
 In addition to the problems of cognitive bias that may be described 
as “heuristics gone wrong,” there are indications that cognitive process-
ing of the subject matters covered by copyright law can take place dif-
ferently on a number of characteristic axes, such as gender.246 Scholars 
have long written about gender differences in the perception of art ob-
jects.247 A brain imaging study showed differences between men and 
women in the cerebral processing of beautiful images such as paint-
                                                                                                                      
241 Guthrie et al., supra note 120, at 813–14. 
242 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Processing Pleadings and the Psychology of Prejudgment, 60 DePaul 
L. Rev. 413, 427 (2011); see Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition at Work, 38 Fla. St. U. L. 
Rev. 107, 140–44 (2010) (calling for judicial humility); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 678 (2009) (articulating new pleading standards). 
243 Rachlinski, supra note 242, at 427–28. 
244 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 1195, 1225 (2009). 
245 See Plous, supra note 235, at 227–30 (offering general suggestions on how to re-
duce the overconfidence bias). 
246 See infra notes 247–251 and accompanying text. 
247 See, e.g., F. Graeme Chalmers, Women as Art Viewers: Sex Differences and Aesthetic Prefer-
ence, 18 Stud. Art Educ. 49, 49 (1977). For example, a study of children showed that girls 
prefer pictures of women and children whereas boys have a strong preference for pictures 
of men. Id. at 51 (citation omitted). 
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ings.248 The researchers suggested that this may correspond to different 
strategies that men and women use to make aesthetic judgments.249 
Gender differences also, for instance, extend to perceptions of and aes-
thetic preferences for specific colors.250 In listening studies, both gender 
and level of musical expertise influenced patterns of brain activation.251 
 Although copyright trials involve many more elements than will fit 
into a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) machine, the cognitive pro-
cesses and differences observed in prior studies are likely to play a role 
in legal decision making. Hence, the effects of particular attributes of 
judges or juries, combined with (1) copyright’s emphasis on the deci-
sionmaker’s direct perception of the allegedly illegal subject matter, 
and (2) the bias-increasing ambiguity of the subject matter, may create 
a dangerously unreliable black box, the ill effects of which are undone 
only with great difficulty in any given trial. Although none of the prob-
lems articulated in this Section lend themselves to simple fixes, the next 
Part describes some ways that may improve decision making in the 
copyright context.252 
III. Copyright for the Boundedly Rational Man:  
Paving the Way For a Solution 
 This Part critiques some of the changes that have been suggested 
to improve the copyright infringement test—such as giving a greater 
role to judges over juries or increasing the use of experts—and pro-
poses a new model.253 It discusses the possibility of implementing direct 
debiasing mechanisms but focuses especially on openly embracing the 
subjective nature of decision making in the copyright infringement 
context.254 I argue for the adoption of social science tools that are 
modeled on those in the trademark area, which would honor this in-
herent subjectivity, help to draw the proper distinction between ideas 
                                                                                                                      
248 Camilo J. Cela-Conde et al., Sex-Related Similarities and Differences in the Neural Corre-
lates of Beauty, 106 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 3847, 3851 (2009). 
249 Id. 
250 See, e.g., Anya C. Hurlbert & Yazhu Ling, Biological Components of Sex Differences in 
Color Preference, 17 Current Biology R623, R624 (2007); see also Natalia Khouw, The Mean-
ing of Color for Gender, http://www.colormatters.com/color-symbolism/gender-differences 
(last visited Aug. 13, 2012) (reviewing some of the empirical research on gender-related 
perceptions of color). 
251 Stefan Evers et al., The Cerebral Haemodynamics of Music Perception: A Transcranial 
Doppler Sonography Study, 122 Brain 75, 80–83 (1999). 
252 See infra notes 253–288 and accompanying text. 
253 See infra notes 255–288 and accompanying text. 
254 See infra notes 255–266 and accompanying text. 
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and expressions, and indirectly but critically minimize the biases dis-
cussed in this Article. 
 Mark Lemley has proposed leaving the wrongful copying step to 
judges rather than jurors, using expert testimony for that step, and po-
tentially adopting an “abstraction-filtration-dissection” approach similar 
to the one used in the software context.255 As this Article has shown, 
however, judges are not necessarily better decisionmakers than juries, 
especially with regard to some of the cognitive biases relevant to copy-
right considerations.256 Furthermore, it is unclear what effect experts 
themselves would have. If each side marshals opposing experts, deci-
sionmakers may go back to trusting their own eyes and ears because 
they have direct access to the key evidence. As to dissecting works of a 
literary or musical nature, Lemley’s concerns about juries’ inability to 
distinguish between protectable and unprotectable elements are well-
taken, 257 but a dilemma arises in adopting his proposal because, at the 
end of the day, the intended audience of the works will be confronted 
with and will be comparing the works as wholes. I hold the view that the 
intended audience should be our main focus in this context given that 
the potential harm that infringement causes to copyright owners, both 
financial and non-financial, results from the perceptions of those 
members of the public who will encounter the works rather than from 
the views of society at large.258 As an additional matter, Shyam Balga-
nesh has argued recently that the substantial similarity analysis invites 
important normative—rather than only utilitarian—values to receive 
consideration when courts allow for “subjective evaluation of wrongdo-
ing.”259 Later in this Part, this Article proposes changes to the copyright 
                                                                                                                      
255 See Lemley, supra note 23, at 741. Jamie Lund has also called for the increased use 
of experts in the music composition copyright area. Lund, supra note 25, at 174. 
256 In addition, there are compelling reasons for preserving a role for American juries. 
For instance, serving on a jury can better enable citizens to participate in democratic gov-
ernment, and possible reductions in the role of the jury deserve a critical eye from that 
perspective. See Jason Mazzone, The Justice and the Jury, 72 Brook. L. Rev. 35, 37–38 (2006) 
(analyzing Justice Harry Blackmun’s views on the jury system). 
257 See Lemley, supra note 23, at 739. 
258 To some extent, this also parallels what we ask patent juries to do when they have to 
determine the views of the “person having ordinary skill in the art” (“PHOSITA”). See 35 
U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). 
259 Balganesh, supra note 15, at 24. As Balganesh acknowledges, “None of this is to 
suggest of course, that courts have developed a unified, coherent framework for the 
wrongful copying analysis.” Id. 
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infringement doctrine that take into account some of Lemley’s points 
and attempt to mediate these other concerns.260 
 A second possibility worth considering is increasing the use of di-
rect debiasing tools by judges and attorneys via admonishments or par-
ticular written instructions to the jury. Though the idea of debiasing 
has been studied a number of times in the psychology literature, “em-
pirical findings about these forms of debiasing have made only limited 
appearances in the legal literature.”261 One of the great frustrations for 
researchers in the area of debiasing is that many biases tend to be so 
powerfully entrenched that experiments have often failed to produce 
significant improvements.262 There are, however, some exceptions to 
                                                                                                                      
 
260 See infra notes 267–288 and accompanying text. There have been some other inter-
esting proposals in the context of solving the legal puzzles surrounding copyright in-
fringement. Jeanne Fromer has explored the idea of using written claims to describe the 
key elements of copyrighted works but ultimately considered that model problematic as 
well. Fromer, supra note 23, at 781–94. Rebecca Tushnet has proposed a complete rejec-
tion of the substantial similarity analysis in favor of a modified version of the standard used 
to determine the legitimacy of derivative works. Tushnet, supra note 23, at 738–40. In that 
framework, “a reproduction right would cover only pure copying and copying so nearly 
exact that observers would be inclined to see two works as the same.” Id. at 739. 
Although Tushnet describes her model fairly briefly, I will delineate a few preliminary 
responses. She states that she is leaving out “problems of implementation,” including “how 
much reprographic copying would be enough to constitute infringement of the reproduc-
tion right.” Id. at 740 n.258. First, I would be interested to see a model in action that 
achieves these distinctions without running into the same problems as those we see in the 
substantial similarity analysis. Second, her model is, by her own admission, “radical,” and 
“does anticipate a contraction in the scope of rights conferred by a copyright over subse-
quent works.” Id. at 738, 740 n.258. There is nothing inherently wrong with either of these 
facts, but they will require a reconceptualization of copyright law of a different sort than 
that proposed in this Article. The goal of my argument is to address an issue that will exist 
no matter where we draw the boundaries of copyright protection: what makes two works 
too similar to each other. This problem persists whether we allow minimal, moderate, or 
generous copying, and whether we analyze it as part of the reproduction right or derivative 
right. I agree with Tushnet on the tension between analytic dissection and gestalt evalua-
tion in the substantial similarity analysis, but I hope that my proposal in this Part helps us 
tease apart protectable from unprotectable elements in creative works, which is one of 
Tushnet’s main concerns. See id. at 740. 
261 Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. Legal Stud. 199, 
201 (2006); see Martin F. Kaplan & Lynn E. Miller, Reducing the Effects of Juror Bias, 36 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1443, 1449–50 (1978) (presenting debiasing methods that 
increase the salience of information relevant in decision making). 
262 See, e.g., Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 104, 99–100 (failing to reduce hindsight bi-
as). See generally Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases 422 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (finding that three debiasing tech-
niques yielded limited success and a fourth, involving intensive personalized feedback and 
training, yielded only moderate, short-term improvements). Some scholars have noted that 
for debiasing to take place, an individual must be aware of the unwanted processing, moti-
vated to correct the bias, conscious of the direction and magnitude of the bias, and able to 
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this trend, such as a partial reduction of hindsight bias in one study.263 
In that experiment, a defense attorney’s closing argument admonished 
mock jurors in a torts case not to use hindsight, to consider the time 
before the negative outcome occurred, and not to let the plaintiff rope 
them into playing “Monday-morning quarterback.”264 The possibilities 
for direct debiasing in the copyright context are worth exploring fur-
ther, though the empirical research so far reveals many obstacles de-
spite the fact that the studies tended to focus on one bias at a time and 
several would potentially need to be addressed for copyright infringe-
ment.265 
 One fairly dramatic proposal that some scholars have made in oth-
er areas to reduce biases is trial bifurcation.266 For copyright cases, this 
would mean having two different juries (and/or judges) for the two 
parts of the test. The decisionmakers for the second prong, however, 
would likely know or could guess that the first prong was met or they 
would have never been convened, which could reinsert the same biases 
one would have had with a unified trial. Another possibility would be to 
alternate which prong gets decided first, so that the decisionmakers 
deciding the second prong would not necessarily know that the first 
prong had been met. Even so, there remain several problems with this 
                                                                                                                      
adjust her response. E.g., Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Men-
tal Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 Psychol. Bull. 117, 119 
(1994). “Since only the first condition can be guaranteed in many situations, including juror 
judgments, it is difficult to imagine a generally effective debiasing method.” Reid Hastie et 
al., Looking Backward in Punitive Judgments: 20-20 Vision?, in Cass R. Sunstein et al., Puni-
tive Damages: How Juries Decide 96, 108 (2002). Some judges have individually begun 
efforts to debias juries by informing them of the issue of implicit biases, but the success or 
failure of these attempts has not been empirically confirmed at this stage. See Jerry Kang et 
al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 55–58) 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2026540). 
263 Merrie Jo Stallard & Debra L. Worthington, Reducing the Hindsight Bias Utilizing At-
torney Closing Arguments, 22 Law & Hum. Behav. 671, 679–80 (1998). 
264 Id. at 675. Some scholars have also suggested ways to reduce confirmation bias, in-
cluding by presenting the debiasing information in a graphical layout. See Maia B. Cook & 
Harvey S. Smallman, Human Factors of the Confirmation Bias in Intelligence Analysis: Decision 
Support from Graphical Evidence Landscapes, 50 Hum. Factors: J. Hum. Factors & Ergo-
nomics Soc’y 745, 751–52 (2008). 
265 See Fischoff, supra note 262, at 440–41. 
266 See, e.g., LaBine & LaBine, supra note 111, at 514 (suggesting bifurcation in deter-
minations of liability for mental health providers); Gregory Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious 
II: Experimental Study on the Hindsight Issue Before the Supreme Court in KSR v. Teleflex, 9 Yale 
J.L. & Tech. 1, 35–37 (2007) (discussing bifurcation in the patent area); John E. Mont-
gomery, Cognitive Biases and Heuristics in Tort Litigation: A Proposal to Limit Their Effects With-
out Changing the World, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 15, 31–32 (2006) (proposing bifurcation for torts 
cases). 
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idea. One of the most significant is the financial and logistical cost as-
sociated with empanelling two juries, thereby duplicating attorney time 
spent explaining certain issues and increasing other trial costs. Another 
is the risk that plaintiffs’ attorneys will, intentionally or not, transmit 
cues to the decisionmakers of the second prong as to the first prong 
having been decided in their favor. Lastly, although the bifurcated ap-
proach could help with issues like the reverse halo effect and hindsight 
bias, the many other problems that exist during the evaluation of the 
second prong on its own—such as confirmation bias, cultural biases, 
general difficulties with the reasonable man standard, and other obsta-
cles—would remain. 
 Here, I propose a different kind of solution to address the multi-
layered complications that the current test engenders. The first step is 
to accept that despite the general designation of the reasonable man 
standard as an objective test, copyright infringement litigation actually 
seeks to determine subjective responses to the materials. If that is the 
case, then the question is whose response matters. As alluded to above, 
this Article takes the position that the relevant determination with re-
gards to harm to the plaintiff is the response of the intended audi-
ence.267 The courts have not always taken a consistent approach to the 
relevant universe, but some cases emphasize the importance of this 
concept. For instance, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded a 
case for determination of whether the spiritual music in question was 
mainly purchased by choral directors with specialized expertise.268 Al-
though the court emphasized that “‘intended audience’ should sup-
plant ‘ordinary observer’ as the label for the appropriate test,”269 it did 
so with the view that its holding was consistent with the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals’ test in Arnstein v. Porter.270 Indeed, the Fourth Circuit 
explained: 
Consistent with its economic incentive view of copyright law, 
the Arnstein court concluded that “the question, therefore, is 
whether defendant took from plaintiff’s works so much of 
                                                                                                                      
267 Balganesh remarks that the intended audience test carries some risks, particularly 
in situations in which “[t]he value of a work to the copyright-holder might, for instance, be 
diminished by the creation of complementary, rather than substitutive copies.” Balganesh, 
supra note 15, at 14–15. He adds, however, that it is not necessarily the case that when fo-
cusing on the intended audience “instead of the default ordinary observer one actually 
alters the underlying content of the inquiry in any significant manner.” Id. at 15. 
268 Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 737 (4th Cir. 1990). 
269 Id. 
270 See id. at 734. 
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what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the au-
dience for whom such popular music is composed, that defendant 
wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to plain-
tiff.”271 
Lemley agrees with this understanding of Arnstein and argues that the 
Arnstein court’s use of the term “lay listeners” may have caused some of 
the subsequent confusion.272 At this time, the Fourth Circuit is the only 
Circuit to have adopted definitively an intended audience test across 
copyright subject matters.273 
 Robert and Eric Osterberg comment in their treatise that “to apply 
the intended audience test, a court must both identify the intended 
audience, and either select only members of that audience for its jury 
or accept expert testimony concerning the intended audience’s reac-
tion.”274 My proposal, which goes a step further and dovetails with the 
inherent subjectivity of substantial similarity determinations, is to in-
troduce survey evidence about the intended audience into copyright 
infringement litigation. This parallels the use of surveys in trademark 
infringement litigation275 but has not yet been the norm, or even per-
mitted, for copyright cases.276 
 Courts have spent little time discussing why copyright surveys 
would be problematic, and their arguments so far do not appear par-
ticularly convincing. For instance, the Second Circuit explained that 
survey questions would run the risk of being either too open-ended 
                                                                                                                      
271 Id. (quoting Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946)). The Fourth Cir-
cuit reaffirmed its focus on the intended audience in a case involving dinosaur costumes 
marketed to children, in which it stated that the court needs to consider the perspective of 
children accordingly. Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 802–03 (4th 
Cir. 2001). 
272 Lemley, supra note 23, at 729. The Ninth Circuit has faced this issue as well, based 
on its reading of Krofft; the court reiterated in a later case that “the test of substantial simi-
larity depends upon the response of the ordinary lay listener.” Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 
F.2d 421, 424 n.2 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. 
McDonald’s Corp. 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977). 
273 See Osterberg & Osterberg, supra note 159, § 3:2.2[D]. 
274 Id. § 3:2.2[E]. 
275 See, e.g., Irina D. Manta, In Search of Validity: A New Model for the Content and Procedural 
Treatment of Trademark Infringement Surveys, 24 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 1027, 1036–41 
(2007) (offering a description of the use of such surveys). Scholars have emphasized the 
need for surveys in the trademark context precisely for the reason that, otherwise, a judge 
or jury will be asked to perform an impossible “Vulcan mind meld” with the consumers of 
a good when instructed to determine their thoughts and impressions. William E. Galla-
gher & Ronald C. Goodstein, Inference Versus Speculation in Trademark Infringement Litigation: 
Abandoning the Fiction of the Vulcan Mind Meld, 94 Trademark Rep. 1229, 1232–36 (2004). 
276 Osterberg & Osterberg, supra note 159, § 17:3 (citations omitted). 
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and general or too specific (citing as an improper example, “Do you 
think [one] is substantially similar to [the other]?”).277 Another, related 
concern is the difficulty of explaining substantial similarity to study sub-
jects.278 This assumes, however, that copyright survey subjects would be 
confronted with direct legal questions, which is not how admissible 
trademark surveys function.279 Rather, subjects in the latter setting gen-
erally have to answer open-ended questions such as “Who do you think 
made this product?”280 These surveys take place in a number of envi-
ronments, including at malls or on the Internet.281 The measure of 
trademark confusion is the differential between the percentage of sub-
jects who, for example, name the plaintiff as the manufacturer of the 
allegedly infringing product, versus those who name the plaintiff as the 
manufacturer of a control product. 282 Although further study and ex-
periments are needed before comparable surveys could be imple-
mented in the substantial similarity setting,283 there may be ways to 
adapt the trademark experience to the needs of copyright. 
 Of interest in this context, one of the scale measures that Jamie 
Lund used in her empirical research on music composition copyrights 
was one of so-called ordinal similarity, where subjects were asked to rate 
pieces on a scale of one to five (with one standing for “not at all similar” 
and five for “very similar”).284 One could use this type of measure to 
assess the degree of similarity that the relevant audience perceives be-
tween two works. My main answer to the courts concerned about the 
vagaries of copyright surveys, however, is that we are effectively already 
                                                                                                                      
277 Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 244, 244–45 (2d Cir. 1983). 
278 Osterberg & Osterberg, supra note 159, § 17:3 (citing Aaron Basha Corp. v. Felix 
B. Vollman, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 226, 231–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)). 
279 See Manta, supra note 275, at 1036–37. 
280 See id. at 1068–69. 
281 See id. at 1070. 
282 See id. at 1068 (discussing control stimuli in trademark surveys). The percentage dif-
ferential that courts consider to be evidence of infringement varies, but it has generally been 
above 20%, with some exceptions of 15% and below. See 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy 
on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 32:188 (4th ed. 2012). 
283 Some of the questions that one would need to answer are how to select the proper 
subjects (how to define the so-called “survey universe”), how to present the works to sub-
jects, what conditions the control stimuli need to fulfill, what exact questions to ask, and 
what threshold to set as the required level of perceived similarity. Allowing for significant 
amounts of judicial discretion on these matters risks reintroducing some of the biases that 
surveys seek to eliminate, so a broadly applicable floor for what is considered appropriate 
evidence could prove helpful. See Manta, supra note 275, at 1066–71 (proposing general 
standards for trademark surveys). I would like to thank Jake Linford for our conversation 
on this subject. 
284 Lund, supra note 25, at 155. 
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conducting surveys, but of the most unscientific kind—ones with a 
sample size of twelve ( jury) or one (judge). Even if we adopt the in-
tended audience test, and even if we include experts, it will be very dif-
ficult for juries or judges to separate their own direct perceptions of the 
materials without the help of surveys. Just as Dan Kahan’s research find-
ings on the Scott v. Harris video probably gave pause to the Supreme 
Court justices who initially trusted their “own eyes” above all and did 
not realize how many others might disagree with them, jurors and 
judges are likely to respond to evidence about what large groups of rel-
evant individuals believe.285 If presented with the perceptions of nu-
merous members of the intended audience, jurors and judges are more 
likely to reach the optimal result than if they are told that their own 
perceptions are the relevant ones or that they need to deduce what an 
abstract, average, reasonable observer would perceive.286 
 Given that study subjects would not know about the context of the 
litigation, surveys would achieve what the bifurcation proposals attempt 
to do—they would reduce hindsight bias and the reverse halo effect. 
Surveys would further provide valuable information through the inclu-
sion of a control stimulus, as can be seen in trademark surveys and in 
Lund’s study through her use of comparison materials.287 This would 
require plaintiffs to delineate the scope of the protection they are 
                                                                                                                      
285 We know from different settings that individuals at times adjust their beliefs based 
on others’ beliefs. See generally Jan Lorenz et al., How Social Influence Can Undermine the Wis-
dom of Crowd Effect, Proceedings Nat’l Acad. Sci. U.S.A. (forthcoming), available at 
http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2011/05/10/1008636108.abstract (describing both 
the positive and negative repercussions of this effect). Of course, the risk remains that 
jurors or judges would still give too much credence to their own eyes and ears, which sug-
gests the possibility that the decisionmakers themselves should not be confronted with the 
direct evidence at all. See Albert E. Mannes, Are We Wise About the Wisdom of Crowds?, The Use 
of Group Judgments in Belief Revision, 55 Mgmt. Sci. 1267, 1277 (2009) (suggesting that indi-
viduals still tend to overweigh their initial beliefs and underweigh the more valid judg-
ment of groups). This more radical version of my proposal remains open to examination 
and certainly has a number of drawbacks. But see Stephen A. Saltzburg, Improving the Qual-
ity of Jury Decisionmaking, in Verdict: Assessing the Civil Jury System, supra note 64, at 
341, 365–68 (advocating for greater use of visual and videotape evidence in trials). 
286 There will certainly be exceptions to this trend. In a series of interviews with Dutch 
judges involved in intellectual property cases, one judge said about survey data: “If it cor-
roborates with our own perception, then we are grateful and use it. If we want to go the 
other way, then it is just a nuisance, because then we have to argue it away.” Dirk J.G. Vis-
ser, How Do Judges Decide Intellectual Property Cases? [Introduction], 31st Annual Cong. 
of the Int’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Teaching & Research in Intellectual Prop. 
(ATRIP), 3, http://www.atrip2012.com/docs/Visser_JudgesDecideIPCases.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 22, 2012). This “arguing away,” however, would likely still yield more information 
during the appellate process than currently exists in the absence of surveys. 
287 Lund, supra note 25, at 158. 
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claiming because the amount of infringement would be determined by 
the differential between (1) the level of similarity between the original 
work and the allegedly infringing work, and (2) the level of similarity 
between the original work and that used as a control stimulus.288 It 
would facilitate the legal decisionmakers’ task of determining whether 
plaintiffs are respecting the idea-expression dichotomy because, as with 
trademarks, a proper survey would have to use a control stimulus that 
uses the same ideas but a different expression. Hence, this would give courts 
better information as to whether it is the protectable or the unprotect-
able elements of a work that are leading to perceptions of similarity on 
the part of the intended audience. The inclusion of a control stimulus 
would also allow for anchoring effects to wash out because both the 
allegedly infringing and the control work would be compared to the 
original, so the original would serve as the potential anchor for both, 
and that effect would be deducted during the calculation of the final 
“similarity differential.” The same is likely true for the confirmation 
bias; both comparisons would suffer from that bias to some extent, and 
its eventual effect would either partially or entirely disappear during 
that same calculation. 
 Defendants would have the opportunity to present their own sur-
veys as well. The costs of copyright litigation would change, but it is un-
clear whether they would increase. Plaintiffs may indeed be more reluc-
tant to bring a copyright claim if they feel the need to commission a 
survey, but to the extent that we worry about deterrence of rightful 
plaintiffs, we could adjust damages calculations accordingly if liability is 
found. The burden on defendants could increase if they have to con-
duct surveys to counter plaintiffs’ surveys, though we may be able to 
shift this by awarding greater costs to defendants if they are successful 
in litigation. It is entirely possible that this will reduce the overall 
amount of copyright litigation, thus lowering the burden on courts and 
hence ultimately on society at large. Many would welcome this devel-
opment, especially if—along with the improvement of copyright doc-
trine that it would provide—it ended up encouraging greater creativity 
due to partial relief from the fear of litigation. 
Conclusion 
 The ideas delineated in this Article are a beginning rather than a 
final conclusion. More empirical work would prove beneficial both for 
                                                                                                                      
288 See generally Fromer, supra note 23 (offering a more extensive discussion of claiming 
issues in copyright and patent law). 
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measuring the precise extent of some of the problems described here 
and for developing solutions tailored to the specific issues of copyright 
litigation.289 This Article has attempted to show the complex relation-
ship between copyright law’s version of the reasonable man standard, 
cognitive and cultural bias, and ambiguity. It has demonstrated why and 
how we should reconcile with the subjective nature of the substantial 
similarity analysis, and it has sketched out possible paths guided by in-
sights from social science. The future remains open, and we will hope-
fully one day develop better tools to measure directly the intended au-
dience’s perceptions of similarity, be it through listening studies or 
perhaps even brain imaging technology when its cost is significantly 
reduced and its precision enhanced.290 The road will be made of in-
cremental steps, but the goal is clear: a more objective approach to 
human subjectivity. 
 
289 See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive 
Science, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 507 (2008) (discussing the dangers of using social science tools 
with insufficient empirical backing in the context of intellectual property infringement, 
and specifically trademark dilution). 
290 See generally Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of the Law, 60 Emory L.J. 585 
(2011) (discussing the potential of new technologies to assess subjective experiences). 
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